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THE COVERAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS
ALANSON W. WILLCOX*
The federal tax which induced the states to enact unemployment
compensation laws set a pattern of coverage which the states were
under pressure to meet, but which they were wholly free to exceed.
With notable exceptions, state coverage is shaped to conform with
federal law. In this matter, indeed, federal leadership is so far ac-
cepted that the charge of federal "dictation" has not, as it has in other
aspects of unemployment compensation, prevented some expansion
of the system by federal initiative.
Coverage of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act starts with the
concept of "employment" as the determinant of tax liability, and then
proceeds to carve out and exclude a number of particular kinds of
employment.' State laws follow the same general pattern, with the
important exception that many of them have undertaken to give by
statute a broader scope to the underlying concept than usually attaches
to the word "employment." A majority of the states have limited,
and a few have rejected altogether, the federal exclusion of small
firms; here and there states have extended coverage into other areas
excluded from the federal law, but more often than not they have
copied these federal exclusions, in many cases substantially verbatim.
I
The boundary of coverage marked by the word "employment" in the
federal law and by analogous provisions of state laws corresponds -
though sometimes none too closely - to the boundary of the risk
against which unemployment compensation affords protection. For
the man who works for himself, unlike the man who works for an-
other, is not exposed to the risk of unemployment in the ordinary
sense of the term. The hazards faced by the entrepreneur are typically
of a quite different kind from those faced by the employee, and are
not such as unemployment compensation is designed to meet. In this,
unemployment compensation differs from old-age and survivors in-
surance, which" deals with risks common to all who earn their living,
and which, though bounded originally by the same test of "employ-
* Formerly General Counsel, Federal Security Agency.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 §§ 1600, 1607(c), 1607(i); INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954
§§ 3301, 3306 (c), 3306 (i). These definitions use the terms "employ," "employer"
and "employee," as well as "employment," but until the amendment of 1948
(see note 24, infra) contained no amplification of any of these words beyond
the provision that the term "employee" includes an officer of a corporation.
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ment," was extended as soon as techniques were developed to make it
possible, first to most of the urban self-employed 2 and more recently
to farmers.3
The line between employment and self-employment, however, is
anything but clearly marked, either in fact or in law.4 An endless
variety of situations and business arrangements lie between what, as
a matter of substance, is clearly the one and what is clearly the other.
It was estimated in 1948 that upwards of a million and a quarter per-
sons worked in this twilight zone.5 The only body of ready-made law
relevant to the drawing of this line of demarcation, derived primarily
from cases dealing with vicarious liability in tort,6 had not been de-
veloped with an eye to those considerations which should give shape
2. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1950, 64 STAT. 477 (1950).
3. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1954, Pub. L. No. 761, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954).
4. An illuminating discussion of this problem and of the efforts of the
courts to grapple with it will be found in LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, C.8 (1952). For briefer presentations, see National Labor
Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1944),; Steffen,
Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. OF Cm. L. REv., 501 (1935);
Teple, The Employer-Employee Relationship, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 153 (1949);
Jacobs, Are "Independent Contractors" Really Independent? 3 DE PAUL L. REV.
23 (1953). The problem arises in many contexts. Jacobs lists 24 federal
statutes and 21 from a single state that require determining who are em-
ployees.
5. The Federal Security Administrator presented this estimate at Hearings
before the Senate Finance Committee on H.J. Res. 296, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
152-53 (1948). More than half of these were "outside" salesmen; other large
groups were taxicab drivers, owner-operators of trucks, private-duty nurses,
industrial homeworkers, and entertainers. It was estimated that the legislation
then under consideration would affect the coverage of from one-half to three-
quarters of a million persons. See H.R. REP. No. 1319, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.,
13,16 (1948).
6. The common-law rule is thus expressed in RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 220
(1934):
"(1) A servant is a person employed to perform service for another in
his affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance
of the service, is subject to the other's control or right to control.
"(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
"(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
"(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct oc-
cupation or business;
"(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or
by a specialist without supervision;
"(d)i the skill required in the particular occupation;
"(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
'(f)- the length of time for which the person is employed;
"(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
"(h), whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of
the employer; and
"(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the re-
lationship of master and servant."
The Restatement comments that the test cannot be "defined in general terms
with substantial accuracy." Id., comment (1)b.
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to unemployment compensation. It is not surprising, then, that the
fixing of this boundary should have proved peculiarly troublesome to
both legislatures and courts;7 that there should have been great con-
trariety of results; or that administrators, employers and employees
should still be plagued by large areas of uncertainty. With the cover-
age of the self-employed under old-age and survivors insurance, the
issue has ceased to be very important in that program, but it remains
a major problem of unemployment compensation.
In drawing this boundary the federal law and a few of tle states
used merely the word "employment" and similar terms, without
elaboration.8 Most courts, without giving much heed to another pos-
sible interpretation, assumed that by using these words the legislatures
had intended to incorporate the common-law test which gives primary
emphasis, at least, to the employer's control over the manner and
means of the employee's performance of services.9 The tendency to
make this assumption was supported by the inclusion, in regulations of
the federal Treasury Department issued soon after the Social Security
Act was passed, of language couched in familiar common-law termi-
nology.10
Since an employer's liability to third persons arises out of the
7. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of legislative and judicial
developments up to 1945 in this aspect of unemployment compensation, see
Asia, Employment Relation: Common-Law Concept and Legislative Definition.
55 YALE L.J. 76 (1945). Teple, supra note 4, carries the discussion of unemploy-
ment compensation experience down to 1949.
8. See note 1 supra. State laws in this group use various terminology, usually
consistent with, but not clearly commanding a common-law approach. See
Asia, supra note 7. A few use the term "master and servant." Recently, two
states have followed the lead of Congress in specifically restricting coverage
to those who are employees at common law. See note 36, infra. For a state-by-
state summary in tabular form, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAWS 6-7 (1954).
9. Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943);
Jones v. Goodson, 121 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1941); Empire Star Mines Co. v.
Emplovrp'nt Comm'n. 28 Cal.2d 33. 168 P.2d 686 (1946); Dumont v. Teets,
262 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1953); Jack & Jill, Inc. v. Tone, 126 Conn. 114, 9 A.2d 497
(1939); Griswold v. Director of Div. of Unempl. Comp., 315 Mass. 371, 53
N.E.2d 108 (1944). Cf. Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1941),
suggesting that -while the same principles are applicable as in tort cases,
particular precedents in the tort field may not be determinative of tax liability
on like facts.
10. 26 CODE FED. REGs. 400.205 (1949). The gist of this regulation is indicated
by the following excerpts: "Generally the relationship [of employer and
employee] exists when the person for whom services are performed has the
right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only
as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and
means by which that result is accomplished." "In this connection, it is not
necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in which the
services are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right to do so. The
right to discharge is also an important factor indicating that the person pos-
sessing that right is an employer. Other factors characteristic of an employer
are the furnishing of tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the in-
dividual who performs the services." With only inconsequential changes, the
regulation now appears in 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 403.204 (1949).
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physical acts of his employee in the course of the employment, there
is perhaps some reason for conditioning his liability on his control or
right of control over the details of the performance. It may be that
the employer can reduce his risk somewhat by issuing and enforcing
adequate instructions concerning the manner of performance of the
work even where, as in most of the borderline cases, the performance
takes place at such distance that no on-the-spot supervision is pos-
sible. But even if that is so, the presence or absence of such detailed
control does not affect the employee's risk that he will lose his job
or the consequences to him if he does, and does not affect either the
incentive or the ability of the employer to reduce the risk. The factors
that do affect the risk are many and complex, and control of some sort
is among them -but not that control over details and particulars of
performance which is ordinarily required as an element of vicarious
liability. The courts that have applied the common-law test to unem-
ployment compensation have made no effort to rationalize its use as
an index of coverage, or even to demonstrate that legislatures, in
using such general terms as "employment," had intended to require
that this test be applied. They assumed that "employment" could mean
only the kind of employment with which they had so long been
familiar.
Eleven years passed before this assumption was tested in the United
States Supreme Court. Experience in that time had convinced many
people that the common-law rules did not afford a satisfactory measure
of coverage.
In the first place, the control test tends to exclude from coverage
many persons who, fully as much as common-law servants, are de-
pendent on their jobs for their daily living and are exposed to the
risk of unemployment. Many a commission salesman, for example,
works full time for a single concern and derives his whole income
from that source, and if the relationship is severed, finds himself in
the same plight as any other worker who has been discharged. He
may (or may not) have enjoyed such freedom from detailed control
of his activities as to persuade a court that he was an independent
contractor at common law, but if he did, his freedom was not the kind
of independence which commonly rids the true entrepreneur of the
risk of unemployment. To some extent, it is true, the common law does
take account of economic dependence as a factor making for control,
particularly by giving weight to a right of discharge which tends to
make the employee sensitive to the wishes of his employer;1 ' and by
11. Press Publishing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820
(1922); Matter of Glielmi v. Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N.Y. 60, 171 N.E. 906
(1930); Feller v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 363 Pa. 483, 70 A.2d 299
(1950); Burchett v. Dep't of Labor & Industries, 146 Wash. 85, 261 Pac. 802
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stressing this factor a few courts have brought the common-law test
into closer harmony with the purposes of unemployment compensa-
tion.12 But by and large, determinations under the common-law test
hinge more on the terms of the contract of hiring and on the other legal
indicia than they do on the economic aspects of the relationship. This
lack of realism in determining unemployment compensation coverage
is much accentuated by the ease with which the factor of control can
be manipulated by the employer, and by the difficulty of penetrating
a merely colorable relinquishment of his supervisory authority.
13
In the second place, the common-law test has conspicuously failed
to achieve either uniformity or certainty in its application. The
Supreme Court has said of this test that "its simplicity has been illu-
sory because it is more largely simplicity of formulation than of ap-
plication. Few problems in the law have given greater variety of
application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the border-
land between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and
what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing.' 4 The
truth of this statement finds vivid illustration in the experience of
unemployment compensation. Though the facts of two cases are rarely
(1927). See LARSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 44.35. This factor is not spe-
cifically mentioned in RESTATEMENT AGENCY, perhaps because analytically it
evidences an economic power to control rather than a legal right to do so. But
even where a legal right of control exists, the effective sanction to secure obedi-
ence is usually the threat of discharge, and to the worker who is dependent on
his job the existence or non-existence of a legal duty is apt to be an academic
question. Indeed, the distinction between a legal right to order a worker to do
a certain thing, and a legal right to tell him that he will be discharged unless
he does that thing, would probably impress most laymen as little more than
a quibble; certainly, as a trivial basis on which to predicate unemployment
compensation coverage. The effect attributed to a right of discharge is prob-
ably the most important single element by which some courts have been able
to give a realistic application to the common-law test as a measure of social
insurance coverage.
12. United States v. Kane, 171 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1948)1; Grace v. Magruder,
148 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1945).; United States v. Vogue, 145 F.2d 609 (4th Cir.
1944); Buell & Co. v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 606, 18 A.2d 697 (1941); Matter of
Electrolux Corp., 288 N.Y. 440, 43 N.E.2d 480 (1942). A different approach
is frequently taken where the workers stand higher in the economic scale.
Dimmitt-Rickhoff-Bayer Real Estate Co. v. Finnegan, 179 F.2d 882 (8th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950); Texas Co. v. Higgins, 118 F.2d 636
(2d Cir. 1941).
13. "As experience developed under these [Treasury Department] regula-
tions, however, it became increasingly clear that such a test permitted em-
ployers to avoid employment-tax liability and deprive their workers of
social-security coverage by dressing up their relationship through so-called
independent contracts, but without, in any material sense, altering their
relative economic positions." Letter from Acting Secretary of the Treasury,
quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1319, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1948). See also Bemis
v. People, 109 Cal. App.2d 253, 240 P.2d 638 (1952); Jack & Jill, Inc. v. Tone,
126 Conn. 114, 9 A.2d 497 (1939); Matter of Electrolux Corp., 288 N.Y. 440, 43
N.E.2d 480 (1942).
14. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 121
(1944).
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identical, the list of conflicting decisions' 5 is too long and the factual
similarities are too great to permit the decisions to be harmonized on
this ground. The ultimate issue is whether enough control is vested
in the employer to meet an ill-defined standard; and in view of the
multiplicity of ways in which control or its absence may be evidenced,
and the subtlety of the influences which in any continuing relation-
ship make for autonomy or for subservience, it is small wonder that
judges should differ widely in their appraisal of similar situations.
In a group of cases that came before it in 1947,16 the Supreme Court
was called upon to examine the assumption which had underlain
nearly all of the lower court decisions on this aspect of social security
coverage - the assumption that Congress had intended to adopt the
variable and amorphous, but usually restrictive, common-law test. The
Court's response to this issue had been foreshadowed in its decision
three years earlier in National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publi-
cations, Inc.,17 that the corresponding provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act had not been intended to incorporate the common-law
test. The Court had held that the word "employee" in that act must
be read in the light of the purposes of the statute as a whole and of
the evils which it sought to correct. Congress, in other words, had
used general terms without definition in order to enable the admin-
istrative agencies and the courts -just as administrators and courts
have evolved a case law under the general wording of many another
statute- to work out, through the process of decision case by case,
criteria adapted to the needs and the purposes of the particular legis-
lation; which might or might not correspond to the criteria worked out
for the quite different purpose of fixing tort liability.
With that precedent before it, the Court first pointed out that the
Social Security Act likewise required a liberal and realistic interpreta-
tion:
"As the federal social security legislation is an attack on recognized evils
in our national economy, a constricted interpretation of the phrasing by
the courts would not comport with its purpose. Such an interpretation
would only make for a continuance, to a considerable degree, of the dif-
ficulties for which the remedy was devised and would invite adroit schemes
by some employers and employees to avoid the immediate burdens at the
expense of the benefits sought by the legislation."
The Court then summarized and applied its holding in the Hearst
case:
15. Teple, supra note 4, lists by occupational category many of the conflicting
decisions.
16. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Bartels v. Birmingham, 332
U.S. 126 (1947).
17. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
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"We concluded that . . . 'employees' included workers who were such as
a matter of economic reality.... We rejected the test of the 'technical con-
cepts pertinent to an employer's legal responsibility to third persons for
acts of his servants. .. .'
"Application of the social security legislation should follow the same
rule that we applied to the National Labor Relations Act in the Hearst
case." 18
Amplifying the criterion of "economic reality" more than it had done
in the Hearst case, the opinion added that "degrees of control, oppor-
tunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency of
relation and skill required in the claimed independent operation are
important for decision. No one is controlling nor is the list complete." 9
In a companion case arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act the
Court added another factor, the extent to which the work is an integral
part of the employer's business. 20
These decisions would certainly have resulted in a very material
broadening of coverage as compared with the rigid application which
most of the lower federal courts had given the control test, and would
have afforded protection to an estimated one-half to three-quarters of
a million additional persons believed to be employees as a matter of
economic reality. But that the Court had no intention of blanketing
in all those in the twilight zone between employment and self-employ-
ment was made abundantly clear by the holding of the majority that
two groups of owner-operators of -motor trucks were "small business-
men" rather than employees as a matter of economic reality, chiefly
it would seem because of the amount of their investment in the trucks,
their hiring of helpers, and the extent to which opportunity for profit
depended on their own efforts; even though what they were doing was
admittedly an integral part of the taxpayers' businesses, and though
in one case the drivers were working for a single company - a fact
considered "important" but "not controlling." The majority were also
willing to let a taxpayer escape liability by showing that a written
contract which purported to vest control in him did not accord with the
realities.21
These decisions left the validity of the existing Treasury regulations
in doubt. While the Court quoted them without disapproval, the only
direct reference to their validity was the oblique remark that "[s]o
far as the regulations refer to the effect of contracts, we think their
statement of the law cannot be challenged successfully." 22 At any rate,
it was evident that if the administrative agencies were to apply the
18. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 712-14 (1947).
19. Id. at 716.
20. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
21. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947).
22. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704. 715 (1947).
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"economic reality" test which the Court had announced, regulations
in the existing form would be seriously misleading to the public. In
due course, therefore, the Treasury Department published a proposed
revision of the regulation,23 which it had worked out in collaboration
with the Federal Security Agency.
While little concern had been evidenced as a result of the Supreme
Court decisions, many and vigorous objections were at once voiced
to the proposed new regulations which undertook to explain the sig-
nificance of those decisions and of the factors which the Court had
indicated should be considered. These objections led to the introduc-
tion in Congress of a joint resolution "to maintain the status quo,"
providing (retroactively to the date of enactment of the Social Security
Act) that none but common-law employees should be considered as
employees for the purposes of that legislation. Despite opposition by
the Administration and a presidential veto, the resolution was en-
acted.24
The two responsible Congressional committees expressed quite dif-
ferent views of the situation to which this resolution was addressed
and of the effect it was intended to have.2 The Ways and Means
Committee, relying primarily on some earlier legislative history which
23. 12 FED. REG. 7966 (1947).
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 1607(i). The resolution added to the definition
of the word "employee" the following language: "but such term does not
include (1)i any individual who, under the usual common-law rules applicable
in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an in-
dependent contractor or (2) any individual (except an officer of a corporation)
who is not an employee under such common-law rules." With minor changes
in punctuation and form, the language now appears in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 3306(i).
25. The principal argument for the resolution was that extension of coverage
should be made by Congress and not by the courts or the administrative
agencies, of course, the argument was unanswerable. It rested, however, on
the challenged assumption that Congress had originally intended the common-
law test to be exclusively applied. Rejecting that assumption, opponents of the
resolution argued that it was designed, not to maintain the status quo, but to
perpetuate an error.
Two other arguments for the resolution may be noted: First, it was urged
that the "economic reality" test was so loose that no one could know who was
covered, and that the administrative agencies would be given almost unfettered
discretion in coverage rulings. Certainly, the Court's incomplete listing of
unweighted factors for consideration in applying the test lent some support
to this argument. Similar criticism, however, can be leveled at any formula-
tion of the common-law rule. The question whether the new test, as cases
came to be decided under it, would have proved more or less definitive than
the common law will presumably never be answered. It was argued, in the
second place, that in the absence of common-law control the employer would
often be unable to obtain from the employee the information needed to make
the required wage reports and compute the taxes. The Treasury Depart-
ment, with its extensive experience in administering withholding as well as
social security taxes, believed that this difficulty would not be great in those
cases where the relationship was close enough to fall within the Supreme
Court decisions. See Hearings, supra note .5, at 5-6. There is no evidence
that the difficulty has proved excessive in those states that extend coverage
beyond the common-law test.
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the Supreme Court had found not persuasive, took the position that it
was correcting a misinterpretation by the Court of the intention of
Congress, which had at all times been that common-law rules should
be applied.2 6 The Senate Finance Committee, on the other hand, took
no exception to the decisions of the Court as it read them, but in-
stead berated the administrative agencies for misinterpreting the
decisions in the proposed regulations. It said, in effect, that the Court
had merely given a "realistic" application to the common-law rules,
pursuant to the existing regulations, which was proper; and that in
proposing to apply different tests the administrative agencies were
acting without authority.27 It is true that, as noted above, the Court
had voiced no disapproval of the existing regulations; that the factors
it found relevant were similar to factors used in applying the common-
law test; and that its disposition of the cases before it was probably
consistent with that test "realistically applied. 28 But it is hard to
read the Court's opinions as merely giving a change of emphasis to
the old criterion, which they seemed in plain language to have dis-
carded for this purpose.
29
What is the effect of all this on the coverage of the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act? It is entirely clear that questions of the employ-
ment relation must now be resolved in terms of the common-law
criteria, and it is also clear that the courts have again been adjured
(as they had been in 1939) to give those criteria a "liberal" or "real-
istic" application. One United States Court of Appeals, relying on the
26. H. R. REP. No. 1319, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). "The issue involved in
the proposed regulations is whether the scope of social-security coverage should
be determined by the Congress or by other branches of the Government." Id.
at 3-4.
27. SEN. REP. No. 1255, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). "The pending resolution
will maintain the moving principles of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in the Silk, Greyvan, and Bartels cases where, in the opinion
of your committee, the Court realistically applied the usual common-law rules.
But if it be contended that the Supreme Court has invented new law for de-
termining an 'employee' under the social security system in these cases, then
the purpose of this resolution is to re-establish the usual common-law rules,
realistically applied." Id. at 2. At a later point the committee said of the
decisions that "properly interpreted they should resolve the conflict of lower
court decisions and encourage nation-wide uniformity of application of the
act." Id. at 7. The report, however, cites with approval at 4, Radio City Music
Hall Corp. v. United States, supra note 9, a clearly restrictive decision.
28. The most doubtful question on this score is whether the Court did not
take a position narrower than the common law with respect to the coverage
of the owner-operators of motor trucks. See separate opinion of Rutledge, J.,
in the Silk case, supra note 2, at 720. Though disparities of the opposite sort
occur far more frequently, it is presumably possible (though Rutledge, J.,
thought not) for persons to be employees for purposes of tort liability and
yet not to be such as a matter of economic reality.
29. The lower federal courts did not generally so construe the Supreme Court
decisions. Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op. Growers, 166 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1948);
Schwing v. United States, 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1947); Woods v. Nicholas,
163 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1947). Cf. Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d
87 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949); Tapager v. Birmingham,
75 F. Supp. 375 (N. D. Iowa 1948).
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Finance Committee's interpretation of the Congressional action, made
a valiant effort to find in the Supreme Court decisions a directive
toward broader application of the statute which survived the joint
resolution.30 But even that court seems in a later case to have aban-
doned the effort.3 ' The more general view has been to treat the earlier
restrictive rulings as reaffirmed, and to pay little attention to the
committees' exhortation to liberality and realism.32 In effect, these
courts have said that Congressional action speaks louder than the
words of its committees, and that Congress has in fact commanded a
strict application of the control test. This view is likely to prevail
unless and until Congress acts to change it.
In the hands of courts sensitive to the purposes of unemployment
compensation, the common-law test may furnish a reasonably satis-
factory criterion of coverage; for the economic facts that make one
man dependent on another for his livelihood are pertinent, at least,
to the issue as the common law poses it. But by definition and by
operation of stare decisis the common-law test is linked - albeit some-
what loosely 33 - to the law of torts, and thus to that measure of con-
trol over the performance of the services which the particular court
demands for the imposition of vicarious liability. Whatever else may
be said, there is little doubt that the Supreme Court undertook to
break this linkage, or that Congress undertook to restore it.3
'0. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Shows v. Higgins, 189 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.
1951). "A superficial view might suggest the conclusion that Congress there-
fore directed a broad interpretation of the concept 'independent contractor'
and consequent narrowing of the category of employees. But such a conclusion
will not withstand analysis." Id. at 867. The court distinguished, on rather
slight factual differences, its decision against coverage in Radio City Music
Hall Corp. v. United States, 135 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1943). In some other cases
sustaining coverage it is difficult to know whether or how the courts may
have been influenced by the Supreme Court decisions and the joint resolution
of Congress. See United States v. Kane, 171 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1948); Capital
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 186 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1951).
31. Zipser v. Ewing, 197 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1952).
32. Zipser v. Ewing, supra note 31; New Deal Cab Co. v. Fahs, 174 F.2d 318
(5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949); Benson v. Social Security
Bd. 172 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1949)-; Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F.
2d 87 (7th Cir. 1949); Ewing v. Vaughan, 169 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1948); Rambin
v. Ewing, 106 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. La. 1952). In the New Deal Cab case the
court said at 319: "Congress thus rebuked the overzeal of the courts in trying
to make a better law than the words of Congress had made."
33. Because of the great flexibility of the common-law test, the linkage is, in
practice, considerably less restrictive than might appear on the surface. See
LARSON, op. cit. supra note 4, § 43.40 et seq.
34. It has been suggested that in interpreting the many modern statutes
which require determination of this issue, the courts might without amenda-
tory legislation revert to the "independent calling" test from which the
common-law doctrine has evolved. Jacobs, supra note 4. In view of the history
recited in the text, there seems to be no possibility of such a development in
unemployment compensation, at least with respect to the federal law. Even
the normal and more gradual growth of the common law, such as seems to
be taking place as that law is applied to workmen's compensation coverage,
may well have been stunted by the joint resolution. LARSON, op. cit. supra
note 4, § 43.40 et seq.
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If the Supreme Court decisions had been allowed to stand and the
new regulations to take effect, there would have been great pressure
upon those states that take a narrower view to make their coverage
co-extensive with that of the federal law.m As the matter turned out,
the only discernible effect in the states was the amendment of two
state laws, which previously had contained broader coverage pro-
visions, to substitute the language of the Congressional joint resolu-
tion.36
In the case of old-age and survivors insurance Congress proceeded
fairly promptly, in accordance with the assumption underlying the
joint resolution, to extend coverage by legislative action. In the case
of unemployment compensation, on the other hand, there has been no
further federal action in this area; and while federal law imposes no
outer limit on state coverage unless by the power of example, it still
must be said that Congress has notably failed to provide constructive
leadership in the solution of this difficult problem.
H
While these efforts have been going forward to delineate coverage
without benefit of statutory definition, and more lately under man-
date to follow the common law, most of the states have been experi-
menting with a quite different approach to the problem. With the
leadership of Wisconsin which adopted the first unemployment com-
pensation law, and with the support of the Social Security Board in
the draft act that it submitted to the states, definitions substantially
in the following form were widely adopted: 37
"(1) Employment... means service .. .performed for wages or under
any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied....
"(5) Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to
be employment subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the
satisfaction of the commissioner that -
"(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from
35. Even where the state law does not contain a provision covering auto-
matically all service covered by federal law, the force of the Supreme Court
decisions as precedents would have been buttressed by the probable intent of
state legislatures that coverage in this area be as broad as the federal tax. But
legislation would doubtless have been necessary in some states.
36. IDAHO CODE, ANN. § 72-1316(d) (1949); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8(g) (1)
(1949). Though the Idaho law had not contained the full statutory definition
described below, it had been held to be broader than the common law. Con-
tinental Oil Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Div., 68 Idaho 194, 192 P.2d 599
(1947). But see In re Pacific Nat. Life Assur. Co., 70 Idaho 98, 212 P.2d 397
(1949). How far the amendment has narrowed the coverage is problematical.
See Blue Bell Co. v. Employment Security Agency, 270 P.2d 1054 (Idaho
1954).
37. See Asia, Employment Relation: Common-Law Conception and Legisla-
tive Definition, 55 YALE L.J. 76, 83-84 (1945).
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control or direction over the performance of such service, both under
his contract of service and in fact; and
"(b) such service is either outside the usual course of the business
for which such service is performed or that such service is performed
outside of all the places of business of the enterprise for which such
service is performed; and
"(c) such individual is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession or business."
There were some variations in these provisions as they were orig-
inally adopted in the various states,38 and in some cases they have since
been amended and in a few repealed. 39 But they are still in force in
much this form in about half the states, and with some modification
in a number of others.
In a few states this statutory definition has been interpreted as not
extending coverage beyond the common-law relationship of employer
and employee. Two slightly different lines of reasoning have been
used to reach this conclusion. One holds that the legislature has merely
selected certain factors from those pertinent to common-law determ-
inations, and that its statement of three of them in the conjunctive is
insufficient to show that the legislature intended a different final
result from that which the common law would reach. 40 The other line
of argument is that service is not performed "for wages or under any
contract of hire," within the meaning of paragraph (1), unless it is
performed in what the common law would find to be an employment
relationship; and that paragraph (5) can therefore come into play
only after that relation has been found to exist, and then, apparently,
only for the purpose of further exclusion. 41 Either of these views
presents grave difficulty as a matter of statutory construction; each
attributes to the legislature a remarkable measure of tautology.
38. Ibid.
39. The "ABC" clauses have been repealed in Arizona (1947), Colorado
(1941), Florida (1947), Michigan (1943) and North Carolina (1949). Pennsyl-
vania has eliminated the "B" clause. Some of the cases from these juris-
dictions cited below were decided after the amendments but, because the cases
arose earlier, applied pre-existing law. The repeal of the "ABC" clauses has
had little effect in Florida, which had interpreted the statutory definition nar-
rowly (see note 45, infra), or in Michigan, which continues to interpret
paragraph (1) broadly (see note 43, infra).
40. Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P.2d 718
(1939). The majority opinion does not discuss the directly contrary holding
of another division of the same court in McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261,
82 P.2d 568 (1938). Though the conflict had apparently been settled in favor
of the broader interpretation by later cases [see Matter of Foy, 10 Wash.2d
317, 116 P.2d 545 (1941)] the court continued for a time to hark back oc-
casionally to the views expressed in the Washington Recorder case. See Seattle
Aerie No. 1 v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 23 Wash.2d 167, 160 P.2d 614
(1945).
41. Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201 (1940).
The opinion in this case is internally inconsistent, for it gives illustrations of
the intended effect of the exclusionary "ABC" clauses which clearly fall
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The former view not only pays little attention to clause "B," but
requires that the phrase in clause "C," "customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business,"
be read as a decription of common-law independent contractors; in-
cluding those, such as many commission salesmen, who are "custom-
arily engaged" in working for a single employer and whose occupation
has been established, not "independently," but by the employer.Y If
this is the true meaning, moreover, the legislature has required that
to be excluded from coverage a worker must meet the common-law
test in clause "A" and then must meet the same test a second time in
clause "C."
Under the latter view, the whole of paragraph (5) becomes surplus-
age; for it is all but mathematically demonstrable that no one could
pass the common-law test which this view reads into paragraph (1)
and then be excluded by the concurrence of all three conditions in
paragraph (5). If there is thought to be any common-law connotation
in the word "wages" (commonly defined as "remuneration . . . for
personal services") or in the word "hire," or in the word "employ-
ment" itself, surely it is overcome by the context in which the words
are used.
43
outside the common-law relationship, and could not therefore be exceptions if
the general rule announced elsewhere in the opinion were adhered to. This
case appears to be a sport. It is contrary to earlier decisions of the same
court [see Creameries of America v. Industrial Comm'n, 98 Utah 571, 102 P.2d
300 (1940).] and was soon explained-away. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 175, 134 P.2d 479 (1943). The Utah court adheres
to the broad interpretation. Leach v. Industrial Comm'n, 260 P.2d 744 (Utah
1953).
42. The "little merchants" who delivered newspapers in the Washington
Recorder case are typical.
43. In those states which originally adopted paragraph (1) or similar
language, but omitted paragraph (5), state courts have taken the same view
that prevailed in the lower federal courts, and have applied their varying
interpretations of the common-law test. See note 9 supra; Asia, supra note 7 at
106-11. But see Bailey's Bakery v. Tax Comm'n, 38 Hawaii 16 (1948). Without
the aid of paragraph (5) or other indication of legislative intent, this con-
struction of state laws seems neither more nor less reasonable than the like
construction of the federal act.
In four states, Arizona, Colorado, Michigan and North Carolina, paragraph
(1) in context with paragraph (5) had been given a broad interpretation be-
fore the latter paragraph was repealed. It might appear that the repeal of
exclusionary clauses would broaden coverage rather than narrow it. In Arizona
and Colorado, however, the repeal of paragraph (5) was accompanied by
changes of wording in paragraph (1) seemingly sufficient to wipe out the
effect of the earlier interpretations of that paragraph. See Dumont v. Teets,
262 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1953). In North Carolina the addition of the language of
the federal joint resolution clearly had that effect.
In Michigan, on the other hand, the repeal of paragraph (5) without change
in paragraph (1) [MIcn. STAT. ANN. § 17.545 (1938)1] has apparently made
little change in the court's previous broad reading of the statutory definition.
Nordman v. Calhoun, 332 Mich. 460, 51 N.W.2d 906 (1952). The common-law
rule has been expressly rejected since the amendment as it had been before,
despite provisions linking coverage with that of the federal act. MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17.545(6) (m), and (7) (1938); Louis A. Demute, Inc. v. Employment
Sec. Comm'n, 339 Mich. 713. 64 N.W.2d 545 (1954); Lievense v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, 335 Mich. 339, 55 N.W.2d 857 (1952).
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The Washington and Utah courts which first accepted these argu-
ments soon repudiated them, though the former continued to waver
somewhat until the legislature put an end to the court's uncertainty
by directing specifically that the common-law test should be disre-
garded in determining coverage.44 But these restrictive views took
root and still flourish in a number of other states, and in most of
them are by now probably too firmly established to be upset by
judicial action.45 Pennsylvania,46 however, where the issue had not
previously reached the Supreme Court, has now swung over to the
majority view.47
44. WASH. REv. CODE § 50.04.100 (1951); McIntyre v. Bates, 272 P.2d 618
(Wash. 1954); Skrivanich v. Davis, 29 Wash.2d 150, 186 P.2d 364 (1947).
See Asia, supra note 7 at 98 et seq.; Teple, supra, note 4 at 159 n.38.
45. Most of the courts which had taken a restrictive view of the "ABC" test
have reiterated their views. Industrial Comm'n. v. Orange State Oil Co.,
155 Fla. 772, 21 So.2d 599 (1945), see note 39 supra; National School of
Aeronautics v. Division of Empl. Sec., 226 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. App. 1950); American
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones, 85 N.E.2d 593 (Ohio App. 1948)', modifying
83 N.E.2d 408; af'd on other grounds, 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949);
Janssen v. Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 64 Wyo. 330, 192 P.2d 606 (1948).
It is difficult to know whether the companion cases of Sears-McCullough
Mtge. Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 197 Okla. 458, 172 P.2d 613 (1946),
and Realty Mtge. & Sales Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 197 Okla. 308,
169 P.2d 761 (1945)1, had adopted the common-law view, or had turned on the
supposed lack of a "service" relationship. Brenner v. State, 201 Okla. 70, 201
P.2d 236 (1948), gives full application to the "ABC" test, but distinguishes
the Realty Mortgage case merely on the ground of control. In Perma-Stone
Oklahoma City Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 278 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1954),
however, a divided court seems to have reverted to the most restrictive views.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that the statutory definition
"contemplates a somewhat broader relationship than the strict common-law
concept," but that it does not extend to contractors who themselves qualify
as covered employers. Trinity Bldg. Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd, 76
R.I. 408, 71 A.2d 505 (1950). In reaching this conclusion the court seems to
have relied in part on the "contractor tacking" provision of the statute. See
infra, at 00-00.
In Tennessee the court has stated that "employment as defined in the
Code has a much broader meaning than it has under the common law."
Levy's Ladies Toggery v. Bryant, 183 Tenn. 372, 192 S.W.2d 833 (1946). See
Goldsmith & Sons Co. v. Hake, 187 Tenn. 88, 213 S.W.2d 15 (1948). These
decisions, however, and possibly the quoted language, dealt with a "contractor
tacking" provision which has since been eliminated from the statute. Tmx.
CODE ANN. § 6901.26D (Williams Supp. 1952). In Sitz v. Bryant, 184 Tenn. 600,
201 S.W.2d 985 (1947), the court apparently applied the common-law test,
but the case has been explained as turning on an election of coverage. Gold-
smith & Sons Co. v. Hake, supra. In Wiley v. Harris, 192 Tenn. 65, 237 S.W.2d
555 (1951), the court held student workers to be covered because they were
rendering "services performed... wages," without considering the exclusionary
clauses, probably because there was no contention that they were satisfied.
These cases do little to clarify the scope of the statutory definition of "employ-
ment." For a discussion of the earlier decisions, see Asia, supra note 7 at 100-01.
46. Department of Labor & Ind. v. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co., 368 Pa.
276, 82 A.2d 897 (1951). The court did not refer to the series of superior court
decisions which had taken the opposite view, but had given a liberal applica-
tion to the common-law test in determining unemployment compensation
coverage. See Asia, supra note 7 at 101-2; Jones v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 163 Pa. Super. 271, 60 A.2d 568 (1948).
47. The Pennsylvania statute has now been amended to eliminate the "B"
clause. PA. STAT. ANN., tit 43 § 753 (1) (2) (1952).
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If a few courts have thus emasculated the "ABC" test, the majority
have accepted it at face value and have come to grips with the very
real problems it poses. Two courts of last resort, previously uncom-
mitted, have recently considered the competing lines of authority and
accepted the majority view; a third has reached a similar conclusion.
The Supreme Court of Vermont said that the statutory language
"is so plain and convincing that we have deemed it unnecessary to go
into the many decisions of other courts."4 8 In reversing the position
which the lower courts of the state had taken, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated:
"Having in mind the broad purposes of this unemployment compensation
legislation as expressed in the preamble to the act, it is our opinion that
it was the intention of the legislature to proiride for a larger coverage of
employees entitled to unemployment compensation than merely those who
would be considered employees under the common law, and to include,
as it expressly states, 'all service performed.., for remuneration,' subject
only to the exceptions specified in other provisions of the act hereinafter
referred to."
The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that paragraph (1) of the
definition was intended to embrace all those "whose employment
status is such that in the event of unemployment they may suffer
equally as those admittedly sustaining the master-servant relation-
ship," and that the "ABC" clauses which were subsequently added
"do not subtract from the significance of the use, of the word 'service'
in the definition of 'employment' .... ,49
Except as some courts have equated the "ABC" test to the common
law, the statutory language has probably narrowed the area where
coverage is in doubt, and has certainly broken the restrictive link with
the rules of tort liability and moved the boundary of coverage ap-
preciably closer to the boundary of the risk of unemployment. Yet
this test like any other cannot be applied mechanically if realistic
results are to be achieved; its use, indeed, calls for a high order of
judicial craftsmanship.
The first question for rbsolution is whether "service" is performed
48. State v. Stevens, 116 Vt. 394, 77 A.2d 844 (1951), citing Asia, supra note
7. This decision was followed in Vermont Securities v. Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n, 104 A.2d 915 (Vt. 1954).
49. Bailey's Bakery v. Tax Comm'n, 38 Hawaii 16 (1948). The "ABC"
clauses had been added first by regulation and later by statute, and may well
have colored the court's interpretation of paragraph (1) of the definition. The
original decision occurred before the adoption of the Congressional joint resolu-
tion (see p. 252 supra)- later in the same year, and the court relied heavily
on the Hearst and Silk cases. Since the Hawaii law now expressly stipulates
that the common-law relationship is not controlling, it is probably immaterial
that the court in the Bailey's Bakery case labored under the misapprehension
that the territorial coverage could not be broader than the federal without
forfeiting federal approval for purposes of tax credits or administrative
grants.
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"for wages or under any contract of hire." The relationship must
involve "service," and the service must be performed in the employ
of another.5 0 If full effect is to be given to the legislative intent ex-
pressed in the "ABC" clauses, however, it is not enough to say that
the concept of "service" includes more than common-law employment;
it must be construed to embrace all those relationships in which one
person, for pay, devotes his time and effort to the business or affairs
of another.5' If a salesman buys goods from a manufacturer and re-
sells them, the fact that title has passed may enable him to argue
that he is selling for his own account and that his service is rendered
to himself. But if the statutory scheme is to be carried out, clearly this
question should be tested by clause "C" of paragraph (5), not by
paragraph (1).52 Other property relationships also, such as that of
lessor and lessee or bailor and bailee, may accompany the performance
of service without removing the case from paragraph (1).53 There
should be no need, as is often assumed, to find that the property aspect
of the relationship is a sham or a subterfuge; for surely the news-
boy, for example, is rendering service to the newspaper, in the sense
in which this statute speaks of "service," even though he has ac-
quired bona fide and valid legal title to the papers he sells. The test
of his coverage should be found in the "ABC" clauses, not in an
attempt to pierce an ostensible transfer of title in order to bring the
case within paragraph (1), where it belongs in any event.
Similarly, the requirement that services be rendered for "wages"
must be construed with regard, not to the immediate source of the
funds, but to the question whether in substance they constitute "re-
muneration" for the services.54
50. While the usual statutory language does not expressly require that the
service be performed "for" the alleged employer [see Skrivanich v. Davis,
supra note 44] a requirement at least closely akin arises from the fact that
liability to pay contributions depends on the individual's being in the employ
of the taxpayer.
51. This statement is not intended as a precise or exhaustive definition. See,
to similar effect, Creameries of America v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 41.
See also, Bailey's Bakery v. Tax Comm'n, supra note 49.
For reasons given in the text, it will not do to say that service is rendered
for a person, or in his employ, only if he is a common-law master. More
tempting, but still inadequate, is the assertion that the relationship cannot exist
if the service is performed in the course of the worker's independently
established trade, occupation, profession or business-that in such a case the
service is performed for himself and not for the alleged employer. By making
clause "C" a test of the service relationship, this view would render nugatory
clauses "A" and "B."
52. Department of Labor & Ind. v. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co., supra
note 46; Journal Pub. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 175 Ore. 627, 155
P.2d 570 (1945).
53. Wolfe, Determination of Employer-Employee Relationships in Social Leg-
islation, 41 COL. L. REV. 1015 (1941); McDermott v. State, supra note 40; Red-
wine v. Wilkes, 82 Ga. App. 645, 64 S.E.2d 101 (1951); Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n v. Collins, 182 Va. 426, 29 S.E.2d 388 (1944).
54. McClain v. Church, 72 Ariz. 354, 236 P.2d 44 (1951); State v. Coe, 239
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When all this has been said, however, difficulties remain. A service
relationship may shade off into a partnership or joint venture in which
each participant is working for all, himself included 55 - a situation in
which clause "C" offers no help, for to the extent that each is working
for himself, his occupation is still not "independently established."
Though a lessor or bailor may be an employer of a lessee or bailee
who uses the property in the performance of services, he is of course
not automatically so, even if he shares in the proceeds of the services;56
here again, a difficult.judgment may be required to fix the point at
which the owner's connection with the services becomes too tenuous
to fall within even the broad concept of service in his employ.
One other aspect of the "service" relationship must be mentioned. If
an employer engages an independent contractor who in turn hires
workmen to do the job, are the statutory criteria to be applied in de-
termining, first, whether the contractor himself is an employee for
purposes of unemployment compensation, and second, whether the
workmen are employees of the principal employer rather than of the
contractor? In the absence of other statutory provisions the answer to
the first question must clearly be in the affirmative, and would seem
to carry with it an affirmative answer to the second; for if under the
appropriate tests the contractor is performing services for the em-
ployer, the services of the workmen who are helping him must be
performed for the same employer.5 7 But some state laws contain "con-
tractor tacking" provisions in one form or another, designed to prevent
avoidance of coverage by means of the "small firms" exemption from
N.C. 84, 79 S.E.2d 177 (1953).; Journal Pub. Co. v. Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n, supra note 52; Skrivanich v. Davis, supra note 44.
55. Wallace v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 172, 103 N.E.2d 467 (1952); Auten v.
Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 310 Mich. 453, 17 N.W.2d 249 (1945); Broderick,
Inc. v. Riley, 22 Wash.2d 760, 157 P.2d 954 (1945). Cf. Johanson Bros. Builders
v. Industrial Comm'n, 118 Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563 (1950); Skrivanich v. Davis,
supra note 44; International Union v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 364, 21 N.W.
2d 711 (1946).
56. Huiet v. Great A. & P. Tea Co.,. 66 Ga. App. 602, 18 S.E.2d 693 (1942);
Grand Leader Dep't Store v. Department of Labor, 415 Ill. 110, 112 N.E.2d
461 (1953); Parks Cab Co. v. Annunzio, 412 Ill. 549, 107 N.E.2d 853 (1952);
State v. Tinnin,-234 N.C. 75, 65 S.E.2d 884 (1951). In Laurel Sports Activities
v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 135 N.J.L. 234, 51 A.2d 233 (1947), affd,
136 N.J.L. 637, 57 A.2d 387 (1949), this seems to be the rationale of the decision,
although the court quotes exclusionary clause "A" without mentioning clause
"B" which was clearly not met, or clause "C" which probably was not. In'other
situations the New Jersey courts continue to apply the three tests conjunctively.
Empire Theatre v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 136 N.J.L. 254, 55 A.2d
238 (1947); affd, 137 N.J.L. 301, 59 A.2d 623 (1948).
57. Graystone Ballroom v. Baggott, 319 Mich. 87, 29 N.W.2d 256 (1947);
O'Brian v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 309 Mich. 18, 14 N.W.2d 560 (1944);
Steel Pier Amusement Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 127 N.J.L. 154,
21 A.2d 767 (1941); State v. Monsees, 235 N.C. 69, 65 S.E.2d 887 (1951); Utah
Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Utah 24, 151 P.2d 467 (1944); Unemploy-
ment Comp. Comm'n v. Collins, supra note 53; State v. Stevens, supra note 48.
In some of these cases the courts found their conclusion with respect to the
workmen aided by "contractor tacking" provisions in the statutes.
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the law.58 These provisions treat employees of a contractor, under
stated conditions, as employees of the principal employer, and have
occasionally been thought to supply a special and exclusive statutory
rule for such cases.5 9 Courts have not always distinguished clearly
between the general problem of a "service" relationship and the par-
ticular problems" sometimes posed by "contractor tacking" provisions.
An adequate definition of a "service" relationship would be as dif-
ficult to formulate as an adequate definition of common-law employ-
ment. The introductory language found in paragraph (1) of the
statute must be read in the light of the exclusionary clauses, which
were plainly intended to furnish the principal guide to coverage and
which can be given full meaning only as the concept of "service" is
broadly applied. The rigidity of the "ABC" clauses as compared with
the common law, on the other hand, has led courts at times to narrow
the concept of a "service" relationship in order to avoid results which
they have considered unreasonable, but which the exclusionary clauses
would otherwise have forced upon them. An element of flexibility
at this point has its advantages, but it also runs the risk that hard
cases may make bad law.
60
58. See pp. 268-69 infra.
59. See Rhode Island and Tennessee cases, note 45 supra; Huiet v. Brunswick
Pulp & Paper Co., 74 Ga. App. 355, 39 S.E.2d 545 (1946); Arrow Petroleum Co.
v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 43, 58 N.E.2d 532 (1944). In Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co.
v. Ramsay, 233 Wis. 467, 290 N.W. 199 (1940), as explained in Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 200, 5 N.W.2d 743 (1942), a "contractor
tacking" provision was taken as indicative of legislative intent, even though it
had subsequently been repealed.
60. See Teple, supra note 4 at 176.
The most conspicuous illustration of this risk has arisen out of the practices
of the American Federation of Musicians, and particularly its "form B" con-
tract, which purport to vest in the establishment hiring an orchestra the right
to control the details of the performance by each member of the band, even
where, as is commonly the case, the band leader is in every substantial sense
the employer. Under the common law or the "economic reality" test the
problem is merely whether a party to such a contract can escape liability by
showing it to be a sham. Bartels v. Birmingham, supra note 16. But under
the "ABC" test, a result in accord with the realities is usually prevented by
clause "B," since the services are rendered in the course of the employer's
business and on his premises. But see Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v.
Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111 (1941).
Both the Michigan and Illinois courts, which have generally applied the
"ABC" test conscientiously, disposed of this situation much as though it were
a common-law problem, Palmer v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 310 Mich.
702, 18 N.W.2d 83 (1945); Mowry v. Board of Rev., 411 Ill. 508, 104 N.E.2d
280 (1952), and then reverted in other cases to a full application of the statu-
tory definitions. Graystone Ballroom v. Baggott, supra note 57 (another
musician case, but presenting quite different facts); Eutectic Welding Alloys
Corp. v. Rauch, 1 Ill.2d 328, 115 N.E.2d 898 (1953).
In Nebraska and Wyoming, on the other hand, musician cases furnished the
occasions for the initial interpretation of the "ABC" test, and led the courts
to adopt-apparently irrevocably-the common-law view. Hill Hotel Co. v.
Kinney, 138 Neb. 760, 295 N.W. 397 (1940); Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v.
Mathews, 56 Wyo. 479, 111 P.2d 111 (1941).
Washington court's occasional reversions to the common-law interpretation.
Seattle Aerie No. 1 v. Commission of Unempl. Comp., supra note 40.
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Once a "service" relationship has been found to exist, it must be
determined whether the facts bring the case within all three of the
exclusionary clauses. Unless they do, an employment relationship
exists for the purpose of this law.
Clause "A" requires that the service be rendered without control
over its performance, either under the contract or in fact. Most courts
tend to equate this requirement with that for a common-law inde-
pendent contractor,61 though there are occasional indications that the
statutory condition may be defeated by a lesser control over details
than the common law exacts.62 The specific requirement of absence
of control "in fact," coupled with the reference to the future, places a
greater emphasis on the practical aspects of the situation than do some
courts in applying the common law; the potentiality of control inherent
in a right of discharge thus assumes peculiar importance.
63
Clause "B" sets forth two alternative conditions. The first, that the
service be outside the usual course of the employer's business, raises
problems chiefly in cases where separate legal entities perform dif-
ferent parts or successive stages of a process of production or distribu-
tion, the question being whether the resulting arrangement constitutes
a single business or separate businesses.M The second condi-
An opposite result was reached in Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
supra note 57, and Maloney v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 Wis. 165, 7 N.W.2d 580,
9 N.W.2d 623 (1943), by what seems a clearly sounder interpretation of the
statutes.
Another example of contracting the "service" relationship, apparently to
avoid a result thought unreasonable, is Michigan Bulb Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, 337 Mich. 292, 60 N.W.2d 150 (1953). The absence of the
"ABC" clauses from the Michigan statute (see note 43, supra), was unimportant
in this case since the "C" test would presumably not have been met. The
court found that the employer had bargained for a finished product, rather
than for services, in arranging that homeworkers should type names and
addresses on advertizing material. The relation between the company and the
typists was tenuous, and on the facts the result is not startling. But as in the
cases involving property interests there is danger of being misled by a false
dichotomy: if the employer's primary concern with the end result were incon-
sistent with a "service" relationship, many who are manifestly rendering
services, including pieceworkers and commission salesmen, might find their
coverage endangered.
61. Department of Labor & Ind. v. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co., supra note
46; Employment Security Bd. v. Motor Express, 117 Ind. App. 113, 69 N.E.2d
603 (1946); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 189 Va.
692, 54 S.E.2d 72 (1949).
62. First Nat. Ben. Soc. v. Sisk, 65 Ariz. 1, 173 P.2d 101 (1946); McNeel, Inc.
v. Redwine, 90 Ga. App. 345, 83 S.E.2d 33 (1954); Continental Oil Co. v.
Unemployment Comp. Div., supra note 36; In re Pacific Nat. Life Assur. Co.,
supra note 36; Murphy v. Daumit, 887 Ill. 406, 56 N.E.2d 800 (1944); Eutectic
Welding Alloys Corp. v. Rauch, supra note 60.
63. First Nat. Ben. Soc.. Sisk, supra note 62; Benton Rapid Express v.
Redwine, 87 Ga. App. 584, 74 S.E.2d 504 (1953); Murphy v. Daumit, supra note62; Journal Pub. . v Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, supra note 52.64. Southwest Lumber Mils v. Employment Security Comm'n, 66 Ariz. 1, 182
P.2d 83 (1947) (disapproved on another point in McClain v. Church, supra
note 54); State v. Stevens, supra note 48; Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v.
Collins, supra note 53.
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tion, that the service be performed outside all of the places of the
employer's business, presents difficulties in determining whether a
salesman's area or place of work, for example, is a place of business
of the enterprise for which he is working,65 and whether a worker's
occasional presence at the company office serves to defeat the condi-
tion.66
The most far-reaching provision of the "ABC" test, at least poten-
tially, is clause "C"; and perhaps for this reason, courts have been
chary of exploring it in full.67 It harks back to the "independent call-
ing" test from which the present-day common-law rule has evolved.68
Given full scope, it requires not only that the worker be himself, an
entrepreneur, but also that the service be rendered by him in that
capacity; and it thus approaches, as nearly as a formal test can ap-
proach, the economic line that bounds the risk of unemployment.
69
Clause "B" also serves to eliminate in the main a problem troublesome
under the common law, or even under the "economic reality" test, presented
by an employer who "contracts out" to an alleged independent contractor an
integral part of a factory operation or the like. Cf. Rutherford Food Corp.
v. McComb, supra note 20; Fahs v. Tree-Gold Co-op. Growers, supra note 29.
65. Industrial Comm'n v. Orange State Oil Co., supra note 45; Babb v. Huiet,
67 Ga. App. 861, 21 S.E.2d 663 (1942); Murphy v. Daumit, supra note 62;
Superior Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 127 N.J.L. 537, 23 A.2d
806 (1942).; Department of Labor & Ind. v. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co.,
supra note 46; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 178
Va. 46, 16 S.E.2d 357 (1941).
Holdings that a geographical area assigned to a salesman becomes, without
more, a place of business of the enterprise leave little room for operation of
this clause. See also Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. Rauch, supra note 60,
overruling pro tanto Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Gordon, 393 Ill. 542, 66
N.E.2d 431 (1946).
66. Arrow Petroleum Co. v. Murphy, supra note 59; Employment Security
Comm'n, v. Champion Distr. Co., 230 N.C. 464, 53 S.E.2d 674 (1949); Northern
Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 353, 140 P.2d 329 (1943); Washington
Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, supra note 40; Sound Cities Gas & Oil Co. v. Ryan,
13 Wash.2d 457, 125 P.2d 246 (1942).
67. In an early case, Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., 124 N.J.L. 487, 12 A.2d
702 (1940), a fd, 126 N.J.L. 368, 19 A.2d 780, the court considered it inadvisable
"at this juncture to attempt any comprehensive exposition of what was in-
tended by this section of the statute." Other courts seem to have been of
like mind.
68. See Asia, supra note 7, and authorities cited in note 4, supra.
69. Using the term "independent contractor" in the sense of which the
Supreme Court used it in United States v. Silk, supra note 16, the regulations
by which the Treasury Department proposed to give effect to that decision
would have enlarged upon this term in language equally applicable to the
"independently established trade, occupation, profession or business" of state
laws, 12 FED. REG. 7966:
"The typical independent contractor has a separate establishment distinct
from the premises of the person for whom the services are performed; he
performs services under an agreement to complete a specific 'job' or piece
of work for a total remuneration or price agreed on in advance; at times
and places and under conditions fixed by him, he offers his services to a
public or customers of his own selection rather than a single person; neither
he nor the person for whom the services are performed has the right to
terminate the contract except for cause; he may delegate the performance of
the services to helpers; he performs the services in or under his own name
or trade name rather than in or under that of the person for whom the
[ VOL. 8
1955] COVERAGE OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 265
The double requirement, that the worker's occupation be "independ-
ently established" and that he be "customarily" engaged in it, clearly
calls for an enterprise created and existing separate and apart from
the relationship with the particular employer, an enterprise that will
survive the termination of that relationship.70 At this point some
courts have tended to apply a rather mechanical test, and to find the
requirement met merely because a salesman, for example, occasionally
handles other products as well as those of the employer, or even
because he is not forbidden to do so.1 1 It would seem that something
more than this is necessary to constitute that holding out to the public
(or to a class of customers of his own selection) which is ordinarily a
characteristic of the entrepreneur; and also, that some examination of
the origin of the worker's enterprise, beyond the fact that it is not
created exclusively by the employer, is called for by the word
''customarily."
The freedom from control associated with entrepreneurial dealing
has of course loomed large in the decisions because of clause "A"
(though a more general autonomy is characteristic of the entrepreneur
than is required under clause "A" by those courts that assimilate it to
the common law). Less stress has commonly been laid on other fac-
tors typical of an independent business, such as investment in the
enterprise, its good will separate from that of its customers, the op-
portunity for profit and the risk of loss, the undertaking of a specific
job rather than a continuing relahonship, and the hiring and super-
vision of employees by the entrepreneur. No one of these elements
is a sine qua non of an independent business, yet each of them is so
far typical that its absence should be weighed. Most important for
unemployment compensation are those factors - investment, good will,
an independent clientele, and the like -which enable the worker to
continue in business if he loses a particular customer, and which thus
prevent that loss from rendering him unemployed. Some of the cases,
without spelling out these considerations in detail, have used general
services are performed; the performance of the services supports or affects
his own good will rather than that of the person for whom the services are
performed; and he has a going business which he may sell to another."
70. Industrial Comm'n v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550,
38 P.2d 560 (1939); Employment Sec. Bd. v. Motor Express, 117 Ind. App. 113,
69 N.E.2d 603 (1946); Brenner v. State, supra note 47; Creameries of America
v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 41; Vermont Securities v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, supra note 48; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, supra note 65; Mulhausen v. Bates, 9 Wash.2d 264, 114 P.2d
995 (1941). In Schomp v. Fuller Brush Co., supra note 67, the court deemed it
sufficient that "when the agreement between these parties was terminated the
claimant joined the ranks of the unemployed." To the same effect is Leach v.
Industrial Comm'n, supra note 41.
71. Department of Labor & Ind. v. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co., supra
note 46; Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Gordon, supra note 65. It is easier
to say that a prohibition of working for others automatically disproves an
independent business. McIntyre v. Bates, supra note 44.
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language broad enough to embrace them,7 2 and it is quite possible
that they may have influenced judgments more than is evident from
the opinions.
A number of statutes expressly require that the services be of the
same character as the worker's independent occupation, 3 and in any
event such a requirement might reasonably be implied. Ideally, it
should be required that the services be rendered in the course of the
independent occupation, for only then is the worker acting qua
entrepreneur. But so rigid a rule would necessitate the drawing of
very difficult distinctions, as when a doctor or a lawyer performs part-
time professional work for a company and simultaneously engages in
general practice.74 If the two undertakings involve work of the same
kind, termination of the particular relationship can in most cases be
better described as the loss of a customer than as partial unemploy-
ment. Even with this limitation the constitutionality of clause "C"
has been questioned,75 and without it the question would be more
serious. If, of two part-time salesmen, one is otherwise engaged in
the independent practice of the law and the second is otherwise em-
ployed as a factory hand, a differentiation in the coverage of their
selling activities because of their other occupations is difficult to ration-
alize under the equal protection clause, and in any event can hardly
serve the purpose of the statute. Read with the limitation implied
where it is not expressed, on the other hand, the distinction becomes
both reasonable and meaningful.
The "ABC" test has not solved the insoluble. In the hands of some
courts it has accomplished little or nothing. Applied by other courts
with an understanding of legislative purpose and economic realities,
72. See cases cited in note 70 supra. In an oft-cited case the Supreme Court
of Virginia said: "We think that it is elemental that one engaged in an
independent enterprise, business or profession has a proprietary interest
therein to the extent that he can operate it without hindrance from any in-
dividual or force whatsoever. These agents have no business to which they
have a right of continuity. They have nothing they can sell or give away.
All they have is subject to cancellation and destruction upon severance from
the company's service. The contract may be terminated by the company at
any time without liability on its part for damages for breach of contract-
a fact which negatives the existence of an independent relationship." Life
& Casualty Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, note 65, supra, quoting
with approval from the state unemployment compensation commission.
73. See Asia, supra note 7, at 84, n.24.
74. Compare, under the common law, Willard Storage Battery Co. v. Carey,
103 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
75. Crockett, J., concurring in Leach v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 41,
raised the question without expressing his conclusion upon it. There are
occasional cases, no doubt, in which the distinction must appear arbitrary
even though the services are of the same kind; for example, the case of two
lawyers working full time for a company, one of whom conducts a trivial
general practice outside his regular working hours. But by and large the
requirement expressed in the Utah law with which Crockett, J., was dealing,
and in some other laws, seems to establish as fair a general rule as is workable.
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it has accomplished more than any other test yet devised toward
bringing the law into harmony with the actualities of our economic
life. Its most vulnerable point is at its base, in the concept of a
"service" relationship; its greatest potentiality lies in the fuller de-
velopment of clause "C."
III
Unemployment compensation does not cover the entire employed
labor force, however employment may be defined. When under the
applicable law an employer-employee relationship has been found to
exist, it remains to consider various statutory exceptions. Some of
these take the form of exclusion of certain employers, resulting in the
exclusion of all services rendered for them. Others exclude services
of particular kinds, sometimes defined in occupational terms alone,
sometimes in terms related to the employer for whom the services are
performed and the amount of compensation, or other factors. 6
Up to the present time, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act has ex-
cluded any employer having fewer than eight employees. 7 State laws
for the most part initially copied this federal exclusion, but by now
seventeen states cover employers of one or more, and twelve others
have exclusions ranging from three to six employees.78
The numerical limitation on coverage was originally defended on
the ground of administrative convenience, buttressed by evidence that
unemployment occurred a little less frequently among employees of
76. These statutory exclusions are summarized, many of them in tabular
form, on a state-by-state basis, in Co¢mPAasoN or STATE UNEMPLOYMENT IN-
SURANCE LAws, supra note 8, at 1-6, 9-13.
Throughout the following discussion Alaska, Hawaii and the District of
Columbia are treated generally as "states."
77. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 1607(a),; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 3306(a).
Federal law requires that employment of eight or more occur in at least
twenty weeks during the year.
The size-of-firm limitations may, in close cases, require determination of
the employment status of persons not immediately involved in the proceedings,
and of persons, such as unpaid corporate officers, who would not in any event
earn wage credits qualifying them for benefits. The prevailing view is that
uncompensated officers who perform only nominal or perfunctory duties are
not employees, but that if an officer performs substantial services he is not pre-
cluded by his office from being considered an employee. United States v. Bern-
stein, 179 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1949); Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo.
317, 104 P.2d 897 (1940); Bay State Harness Ass'n v. Division of Empl. Sec.,
327 Mass. 296, 98 N.E.2d 361 (1951); Davie v. Mandelson Co., 90 N.H. 545, 11
A.2d 830 (1940); Miller Auto Gear & Parts Co. v. Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n, 132 N.J.L. 34, 38 A.2d 292 (1944); Paramus Bathing Beach v. Di-
vision of Empl. Sec., 31 N.J. Super. 128, 105 A.2d 860 (1954)'; Elgin v. Bryant,
181 Tenn. 317, 181 S.W.2d 329 (1944). Cf. Crouch v. Murphy, 390 Ill. 112,
60 N.E.2d 879 (1945).
78. Most state laws require that the stipulated minimum employment occur
in a certain number of weeks in the year, usually twenty. A few laws con-
tain additional or alternative minimum requirements in terms of amount of
payroll.
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small firms.79 By now, experience in those states which have re-
stricted or eliminated this exclusion, as well as experience with old-
age and survivors insurance, has shown the feasibility of extending
coverage to small firms; while more recent evidence indicates only a
very slightly lesser incidence of unemployment in such firms.80 Con-
gress, accordingly, last year modified the exclusion from the federal
law, so that beginning next January the tax will apply to employers
of four or more.8 ' In view of this amendment of federal law, it is safe
to predict that state exclusions of employers of more than three per-
sons will soon disappear.
State laws 82 with numerical limitations commonly contain provis-
ions, which take various forms, designed to prevent the avoidance
of coverage by splitting a business into smaller units, or designed to
effect coverage of employers who meet the federal numerical limita-
tion only because of operations in other states. The most important
provisions of the former kind 83 relate to separate employing units
under common ownership or control, and to the "contracting out" of
a portion of a business. Among provisions of the latter kind are those
for automatic coverage of any employing unit covered by federal law;
while provisions for voluntary coverage, though serving a larger pur-
pose, also help to make the state coverage as broad as the federal.
An employing unit too small to be covered by virtue of its own
employment is in thirty-two states made liable if it is under common
ownership or control with (or itself owns or controls) another unit
79. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510-12, 520-21
(1937), reversing the three-judge district court which had held the Alabama
law unconstitutional on this ground (17 F. Supp. 225); Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584-85 (1937).
80. Hearings before the Ways and Means Committee on H.R. 6537, H.R.
8857 and other bills, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14, 31-33 (1954). The Administra-
tion recommended that the federal law be amended to cover employers of
one or more, without time limitation. The committee, though recognizing the
desirability of covering as many as possible, concluded that differences in
state and local conditions required that the smallest firms continue to be
excluded from the federal act, and the decision about their coverage thus be
left to the states. H. R. REP. No. 2001, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1954).
81. Pub. L. 767, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1954). The twenty weeks requirement
is continued. The amendment will result in coverage of an estimated 1.3 million
of the 3.4 million persons now excluded by size-of-firm limitations. H. R. REP.
No. 2001, supra note 80 at 2.
82. State laws use the term "employing unit" to describe approximately what
the dictionary describes as an "employer"-that is, a person or other entity
having in its employ one or more individuals, without regard to frequency or
duration of employment, and without regard to the kind of service (whether
covered or excluded). Except as all employing units may be required to keep
certain records and make reports, the function of this definition is to serve
as the first step in determining who are "employers" covered by the laws.
83. The most frequent, but perhaps least important, provision of this kind
merely makes clear that an employment unit maintaining two or more estab-
lishments within a state shall nevertheless be considered as a single employing
unit. Many laws also contain provisions dealing specifically with successors
to the business or assets of an employing unit.
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and the aggregate employment meets the statutory test. Sometimes,
but not always, it is required that the businesses be of like character.
These provisions have been a prolific source of litigation, both consti-
tutional84 and interpretative. The statutes vary considerably in their
terms, but they contain the same central concepts of "owned," "con-
trolled" and "the same interests" -concepts that give rise to many
difficulties both in their interpretation and in their application to con-
crete cases.85 The efficacy of the provisions is increased, but their ap-
plication is not made easier, by the usual stipulation that control need
not be legally enforcible.
"Contractor tacking" provisions, in quite diverse forms, appear in
the laws of fourteen states with numerical coverage limitations.
8 6
Generally, these provisions are to the effect that an employer who
contracts for the performance of work which is a part of his usual
business shall be deemed to be the employer of the contractor's em-
ployees; but often the provisions are made inapplicable if the con-
tractor is himself a covered employer, in which case some statutes
expressly render him solely liable for contributions on account of his
own employees. These provisions make no distinction between an
individual and a corporate contractor, and do not undertake to make
an individual contractor, as distinguished from those working for him,
an employee of the principal employer. As noted above,87 the bearing
84. The statute has been held invalia in Georgia, and in Indiana and Mary-
land if applied to common ownership of corporate stock without more. Royal
Cigar Co. v. Huiet, 195 Ga. 852, 25 S.E.2d 810 (1943); Independent Gasoline Co.
v. Bureau of Unempl. Comp., 190 Ga. 613, 10 S.E.2d 58 (1940) cert. denied, 311
U.S. 707 (1940). Unemployment Comp. Bd. v. Warrior Petroleum Co., 221
Ind. 180, 46 N.E.2d 827 (1943); Benner-Coryell Lumber Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd., 218 Ind. 20, 29 N.E.2d 776 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 698 (1941);
Unemployment Comp. Bd. v. Albrecht, 183 Md. 87, 36 A.2d 666 (1944). By
far the greater weight of authority is to the contrary. New Haven Metal &
Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 213, 21 A.2d 383 (1941); Zehender &
Factor v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 258, 53 N.E.2d 944 (1944),; Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n v. Androscoggin Junior, 137 Me. 154, 16 A.2d 252 (1940); Outdoor
Display Adv. Corp. v. Hake, 186 Tenn. 206, 209 S.W.2d 11 (1948); State v. Kitsap
County Bank, 10 Wash.2d 520, 117 P.2d 228 (1951)t It should be noted that the
statute does not make one employing unit liable for the contributions of
another.
85. For illustrations of these problems, in addition to the cases cited in note
84 supra, see Church v. Collier, 71 Ariz. 353, 227 P.2d 385 (1951); Pipe Trades
v. Rauch, 2 Ill.2d 278. 118 N.E.2d 319 (1954).; Schusterman v. Appeal Board,
336 Mich. 246, 57 N.W.2d 869 (1953); Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165, 164
S.W.2d 285 (1942).
86. Another common provision is that when an employee or agent hires
helpers or assistants, or when he does so with the knowledge of the employer,
the helpers or assistants shall be treated as employees of the employer. Such
provisions seem not to have been much availed of, and it is not clear how far
they are more than merely declaratory. Cf. Hartwig-Dischinger Realty Co.
v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 350 Mo. 690, 168 S.W.2d 78 (1943); Brown
V. Corriveau, 104 A.2d 516 (N.H. 1954); Matter of Bernstein, 266 App. Div.
459, 43 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1943), affd 292 N.Y. 617, 55 N.E.2d 378 (1944). But see
Briggs v. Corsi. 285 App. Div. 87, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 307 (1954).
87. See p. 262, supra.
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of these provisions on definitions of the employment relationship has
proved troublesome. Basically, these provisions are designed to pre-
vent avoidance of coverage,8 8 and it would seem that they should not
be construed as denying coverage otherwise granted by the statute,
either of the contractor himself or of his employees.89
Most state laws contain provisions automatically treating as an
"employer" any employing unit which is an "employer" under federal
law, and treating as "employment" any services which are "employ-
ment" under federal law.90 All states with numerical limitations
authorize small firms to elect coverage. 91 These provisions taken to-
gether not only serve to cover small intrastate units of larger inter-
state employers, but will greatly facilitate the transition next year to
federal coverage of employers of four or more.
Aside from exclusions based on the size of the employing firm, the
principal excluded employers are governments and certain of their
instrumentalities; railroads; and those non-profit religious, charitable,
scientific, literary or educational organizations which are exempt from
the federal income tax. (Farmers and housewives are generally ex-
cluded also, not because they are farmers or housewives, but because
all of their employment is excluded as agricultural labor or domestic
service.)
Exclusion of state and local governments from the federal tax, and of
the federal government from state laws, rests basically on constitu-
88. Hedrick Const. Co. v. State, 82 Ga. App. 647, 62 S.E.2d 218 (1950); Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n. 128 N.J.L. 611, 27 A.2d
889 (1942), aff'd, 130 N.J.L. 173, 31 A.2d 818 (1943); Goldsmith & Sons Co. v.
Hake, supra note 45. These cases suggest some of the problems inherent in
determining what constitutes a part of the employer's usual business. See
also. Glidden Rural Elec. Co-op. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 236 Iowa 910,
20 N.W.2d 435 (1945),; Matter of Fischer, 287 N.Y. 497, 41 N.E.2d 71 (1942).
89. A provision making a contractor who is himself a covered employer
solely liable for contributions on behalf of his own employees does not in terms
prevent application of the usual statutory test to determine whether he him-
self is an employee. It is anomalous but not impossible that the statute should
treat the same individual as an employee and at the same time as sole employer
of his helpers. In Kansel v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 136 N.J.L. 614,
57 A.2d 391 (1948). the court relied on the fact that contractors met all three
clauses of the "ABC" test as indicating that they did not fall within the
"tacking" provision.
90. In Michigan the court has found it necessary, in order to avoid an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power, to construe such a provision
as limited to federal law and interpretations of federal law in existence when
the state provision was enacted. See Lievense v. Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n, supra note 43. Cf. Industrial Comm'n v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co.,
152 Fla. 55, 10 So.2d 793 (1942); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Employment Sec.
Comm'n, 231 Iowa 889, 2 N.W.2d 262 (1942); Cowiche Growers v. Bates, 10
Wash.2d 585, 117 P.2d 624 (1941).
91. It is ordinarily to the financial advantage of an employer who is subject
to the federal tax to be covered by state law, since he obtains credit against
the federal tax. not only for contributions paid to the state, but also for amounts
by which his state contributions are reduced as a result of experience rating.
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tional considerations; 92 while the exclusion of foreign governments
accords with long-standing usage. There is nothing to preclude a
government from granting unemployment benefits to its own em-
ployees, however, and the federal government and a few of the states
now do so.
Beginning with the "G.I. Bill of Rights" in 1944,93 the federal govern-
ment has provided unemployment compensation for veterans.94 In 1954
it extended unemployment protection to substantially all federal ci-
vilian employment, effective at the beginning of this year.95 These pro-
grams are operated through state unemployment compensation agen-
cies, acting not as administrators of their respective state laws, but as
agents of the United States,95 the federal government making no
contributions to the state funds but, instead, paying the costs of bene-
fits and administration as they arise. Most substantive and procedural
provisions of state laws are applied in determining whether compen-
sation is payable and, in the case of federal civilian employment, its
amount and duration.
Connecticut, New York and Wisconsin cover all or some state em-
ployees, and permit their political subdivisions to elect coverage. 97 A
few other states cover some public functions, or permit elective
coverage by subdivisions or instrumentalities. But coverage of state
and local public employment remains definitely the exception rather
than the rule.
The Social Security Act originally excluded "instrumentalities" of
federal, state or local government, without further definition -a pro-
vision which caused much uncertainty because of the ambiguity of
the word "instrumentality." The uncertainty was greatly reduced
in 1939 by amendments limiting the exclusion, generally, to wholly
92. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra note 79; Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., supra note 79. While the federal government could doubtless
impose a payroll tax on certain activities of the states and their subdivisions
which are characterized as non-governmental [South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934); Cali-
fornia v. Anglim, 129 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 699], the
difficulty of bounding this power, together with the "wholesome respect for the
proper policy of another sovereign' referred to in the Carmichael case, has
led to a total exclusion.
93. SERViCEMEN'S READJUSTMENT ACT or 1944, tit. V; 58 STAT. 284, 295; 38
U.S.C.A, § 696 (1944). This program had terminated prior to the outbreak
of the Korean hostilities.
94. VETERmS REAwuSTMNT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1952, tit. IV; 66 STAT. 663,
684; 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 991-99 (1952). This program is now in process of termina-
tion pursuant to proclamation of the President. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1955.
95. Pub. L. 767, supra note 81. With respect to coverage of certain seamen
employed on vessels of the United States, see pp. 280-81, infra.
96. In each case the Secretary of Labor has a residual authority to pay
benefits in any state which declines to act on behalf of the United States.
97. CoNN. Pun. ACT No. 354 (1953); N.Y. LABOR LAW, §§ 512, 579, 580; Wis.
STAT. §§ 108.02(4),(a) and (f), 108.02(5)1(f) (1951); Wis. LAws oF 1953, c. 483.
Wisconsin covers compulsorily cities of the first class.
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owned instrumentalities, and granting consent to nondiscriminatory
state coverage of those federal instrumentalities which were thus sub-
ject to the federal tax.9 8 With some exceptions (which are not very
important because of provisions for voluntary coverage), the states
have availed themselves of this permission and have amended their
laws to cover national banks, state banks members of the Federal
Reserve System, and similar federal "instrumentalities."99 Some states
have and some have not limited the exclusion of state and local instru-
mentalities to those wholly owned by state or local government. 00
The exclusion of railroad employment is coterminous with the cov-
erage of the federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act.' 10 Not
only the railroads are covered by that act, but also subsidiaries and
affiliates engaged in railroad "transportation" services within the
meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act.
10 2
98. These amendments also granted consent to the coverage of services per-
formed on federal territory. SOCIAL SEcURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1939; 53
STAT. 1360, 1392-94; INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 1606(b), (c) and (d), 1607(c);
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3305(b), (c) and (d), 3306(c). The exclusion was
continued in the case of any federal instrumentality exempt by virtue of other
federal law (such as an organization possessing a general tax exemption broad
enough to include the unemployment tax), and of any state instrumentality
constitutionally immune from the federal tax.
With respect to the situation obtaining prior to the amendments, see Buck-
staff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U.S. 358 (1939).
99. The federal permission is coupled, not only with a prohibition of dis-
crimination, but with a condition that the state provide for a refund of con-
tributions if the state law is not certified by the Secretary of" Labor for the
year. Compliance with this condition has been held a prerequisite to manda-
tory coverage of national banks [Barnes v. Anderson Nat. Bank, 293 Ky. 592,
169 S.W.2d 833 (1943); First Nat. Bank v. Bergan, 119 Mont. 1, 169 P.2d 233
(1946); Matter of Bank of Manhattan Co., 293 N.Y. 515, 58 N.E.2d 713 (1944) ],
or of state banks members of the Federal Reserve System. Barnes v. Ander-
son Nat. Bank, supra. The problem is not substantial, however, because banks
with sufficient employees to be subject to the federal tax ordinarily have an
incentive to elect state coverage (see note 91, supra). That they may do so,
see CCH UNEMP. INS. SERV., N.J., 1111 325.09, 1357.02; Id., Tenn., 1325.01. In the
absence of election New Jersey holds national banks and federal credit unions
to be exempt. Wekearnyan Fed. Credit Union v. Zuna, 31 A.2d 490 (N.J.,
1943); National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n, 126 N.J.L. 387, 19 A.2d 803 (1941).
100. In the absence of this limitation, a public officer who hires his own
assistants has been held to be an instrumentality. Brown v. Corriveau, supra
note 86. Cf. Matter of Kinney, 257 App. Div. 496, 14 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1939),
aff'd, 281 N.Y. 840, 24 N.E.2d 494 (1939); Briggs v. Corsi, 285 App. Div. 87, 135
N.Y.S.2d 307(1954); Merion v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 142 Ohio St.
628, 53 N.E.2d 818 (1944). The performance of functions under contracts
with a state, however, has been held insufficient to constitute the contractor
a state instrumentality. Department of California, V.F.W. v. Kunz, 269 P.2d
882 (Cal. App. 1954). Cf. First State Bank v. Thomas, 38 F. Supp. 849 (N.D.
Tex. 1941).
101. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 351-67 (1951).
102. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co., 326 U.S.
446 (1946), the Court left open the question whether the coverage may be
somewhat broader than is indicated in the text. That it is somewhat broader,
at least, appears from Universal Carloading & Distr. Co. v. Pedrick, 184 F.2d
64 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 905 (1950); Universal Carloading &
Distr. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 172 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Spencer
v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 166 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948); Despatch Shops
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The exclusion of non-profit organizations from the federal act is
taken almost verbatim from what was formerly Section 101 (6) of the
Internal Revenue Code, but without the limitations imposed in 1950
and 1954 upon the income tax exemption of such organizations.
0 3
Social security coverage in this area is thus still plagued by the un-
certainty, which had long prevailed in the income tax field, with re-
spect to the status of "feeder" corporations and other arrangements
under which business activity is carried on for profit but its proceeds
are devoted to charitable or similar purposes. 0 4 Like problems have
arisen in the states.
05
An organization, even though it be non-profit, is not exempt unless
it is both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the
statutory purposes. Of an alleged educational organization, the Su-
preme Court has said that "the presence of a single noneducational
purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regard-
less of the number or importance of truly educational purposes."'
' 0
Under like statutory language state courts have reached the same
result.107 But this ruling does not answer the myriad questions about
what constitutes religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
what advantages to the participants deprive the organization of its
v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 153 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Despatch Shops v.
Railroad Retirement Bd., 154 F.2d 417. (2d Cir. 1946). In Adams v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 214 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1954), to the same effect, a part only of
a subsidiary was held to be covered by the railroad legislation. Another il-
lustration of the difficulty of this line of demarcation is found in United
States v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 157 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
849 (1947), and Los Angeles Ry. v. Department of Empl., 80 Cal. App.2d 954,
183 P.2d 366 (1947).
None of these cases appears to affect the authority of earlier decisions that
certain railroad-owned steamship and motor bus lines are not subject to
the railroad legislation. Magruder v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 144 F.2d
130 (4th Cir. 1944); Allen v. Ocean S.S. Co., 123 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1941);
Interstate Transit Lines v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 332 (D. Neb. 1943).
103. Revenue Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 906, 953; INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 101
(last paragraph); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 502, 511-15. The exemption itself
has also been slightly modified in the new Code.
104. For recent social security cases dealing with this subject, see United
States v. Community Services, 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 932, 343 U.S. 911 (1952); Sico Co. v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 197 (Ct.
Cl. 1952).
105. In re Gem State Academy Bakery, 70 Idaho 531, 224 P.2d 529 (1950);
American Medical Ass'n v. Board of Rev., 392 Ill. 614, 65 N.E.2d 350 (1946);
Div. of Employment Security v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. App.
1951); Sioux Falls Post No. 15 v. Williamson, 73 S.D. 250, 41 N.W.2d 647 (1950);
Virginia Mason Hosp. Ass'n v. Larson, 9 Wash.2d 284, 114 P.2d 976 (1941).
106. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
107. Department of California, V.F.W. v. Kunz, supra note 100; American
Medical Ass'n v. Board of Rev., supra note 105; Chamber of Commerce v. Un-
employment Comp. Comm'n, 356 Mo. 323, 201 S.W.2d 771 (1947); Consumers'
Research v. Evans, 128 N.J.L. 95, 24 A.2d 390 (1942), aff'd, 132 N.J.L. 431, 40
A.2d 662 (1945): Matter of Emil Hubsch Post, 278 App. Div. 460, 106 N.Y.S.2d
727 (1951), alf-d, 303 N.Y. 682, 102 N.E.2d 838 (1951); Fleming Hosp. v. Wil-
liams, 169 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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non-profit status; or what constitutes attempting to influence legisla-
tion. On all these questions there is a plethora of decided cases under
tax laws, which the identity of statutory language has apparently made
applicable (sometimes including a rule of liberal interpretation in
favor of the taxpayer) to federal and state social security laws.108
Aside from these total exclusions from the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act, many other tax-exempt organizations'0 9 are granted unem-
ployment tax exemption with respect to various minor services ren-
dered in their employ -services rendered for less than $50 a quarter;
dues-collecting or ritualistic services for fraternal beneficiary organi-
zations; and services of students attending schools, colleges or uni-
versities. The exemption last mentioned applies also to services of
students for educational institutions not exempt from the income tax.
Thirty-three states have adopted one or more of these exemptions;
twenty-five have adopted all of them.
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act also exempts completely a few
other groups of employers. These include agricultural or horticultural
organizations exempt from income tax under Section 501 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954; 11 certain voluntary employees' benefit
associations; international organizations; and, on condition of recipro-
cal exemption, wholly owned instrumentalities of foreign governments.
States vary widely in the extent to which they have adopted similar
exclusions.
Three other minor exemptions from the federal tax turn in part on
the identity of the employer. One of these, which has been adopted in
nearly every state, excludes service in the employ of the worker's son,
daughter or spouse or, if the worker is under twenty-one, in the employ
of his father or mother."' The second, which is in effect in twenty-
nine states, is of the services of a student nurse in the employ of a
hospital or nurses' training school while she is attending an approved
school. The third, also adopted in twenty-nine states, excludes the
services of most internes in the employ of hospitals.
112
108. These problems are sufficiently illustrated by the cases cited in notes
104-107, supra, as is the diversity of opinion on the question whether such
exemptions should be liberally or strictly construed - a question the Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to decide in the Better Business Bureau case.
109. Formerly, these were all organizations exempted from income tax by
§ 101 of the Internal Revenue Code. Under the new Code (1954), they are
organizations exempted by § 501 (a), other than organizations described in
§ 401 (a); or exempted by § 521.
110. Formerly § 101 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code. In this case the limi-
tation with respect to "feeder" corporations has been carried over into social
security coverage. On the scope of this exemption generally, see Squire v.
Sumner Rhubarb Growers' Ass'n, 184 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1950).
111. The difficulty of establishing the fact of either employment or un-
employment in these intrafamily situations undoubtedly accounts for this
exclusion.
112. The exclusion of service on foreign vessels should perhaps also be
considered as employer-related. See p. 282, infra.
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Casual labor not in the course of the employer's trade or business is
excluded from the federal act and from the laws, again, of twenty-
nine states. Since 1950 the federal exemption does not apply if the
worker is regularly employed by the same employer and is paid $50
or more a quarter.
113
Turning to the exclusions which are wholly or largely occupational
in nature, we find three in the federal act and others in a number of
state laws which stem primarily from controversies over the employer-
employee relationship. Thus, the federal act excludes the services
of a child under eighteen in delivering or distributing newspapers to
customers, and services of anyone in the sale of newspapers or maga-
zines to customers under specified financial arrangements;114 and
services of an insurance agent or solicitor paid solely by commission. 1 5
Eighteen states specifically exclude the services of real estate agents
paid by commission. These exclusions from federal and state laws,
and perhaps occasional other state exclusions, provide legislative rules
of thumb for situations in which determinations of the existence of
both employment and unemployment had proved troublesome."
6
The federal act and virtually all state laws contain two major oc-
cupational exclusions, domestic service and agricultural labor, and
formerly contained a third, service as an officer or member of the crew
of a vessel, which is now largely obsolete.
The exclusion of domestic service applies to service in a private
home and also, under the federal act and the laws of thirty-eight
states, to service in a local college club, fraternity or sorority. Only
New York covers domestic service, and then only when four or more
113. SOCIAL SEcURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1950, § 209(b); 64 STAT. 477, 546.
114. These exclusions were added by an amendment, 62 STAT. 195 (1948), also
enacted over the President's veto, while the more general resolution "to
maintain the status quo" (see p. 252, supra) was under consideraticn in
Congress.
115. This exemption from the federal law has been held inapplicable to an
industrial life insurance agent whose chief duty is the collection of premiums.
Capital Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Bowers, supra note 30. Under identical
language, state courts have reached an opposite result. Washington Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Unemployment Security Comm'n, 61 Ariz. 112, 144 P.2d 688 (1944);
Comm. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Rev., 414 Ill. 475, 111 N.E.2d 345 (1953);
American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Keitel, 353 Mo. 1107, 186 S.W.2d 447 (1945); Home
Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 181 Va. 811, 27 S.E.2d
159 (1943). These cases illustrate the problems in determining what consti-
tutes payment solely by commission.
In Washington Nat. Ins. Co. v. Board of Rev., 1 N.J. 545, 64 A.2d 443 (1949), an
exemption was hel invalid and inoperative because it was expressly made in-
applicable to industrial life insurance agents, while applying to other in-
dustrial insurance agents. It has now been so amended that no industrial in-
surance agents are excluded by it. N.J. STAT. ANN., § 43:21-19 (Supp. 1954).
116. Contrast the rule-of-thumb incusion of certain borderline services-
full-time life insurance salesmen among others -as employment for purposes
of old-age and survivors insurance. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 1426(d) (1939);
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3121(d) (1954); SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, § 210(k)
(1935), 42 U.S.C.A. § 410(k) (Supp. 1954).
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domestics work for one employer." 7 This exclusion gives rise to
problems of a minor order-what constitutes domestic service, what
constitutes a private home, and the like." 8
The exclusion of agricultural labor, on the other hand, has probably
been, next only after the delineation of the employment relationship
itself, the most difficult and troublesome of all the boundaries of un-
employment compensation coverage." 9 In addition to the nature of
the physical operation involved in any service, and its relation to the
primary agricultural pursuits, it is commonly necessary to consider
whether it is performed on or off the farm and whether it is performed
in the employ of the farmer or of someone else. The problems are ag-
gravated by the great diversity of arrangements under which farm
products are handled, both on the farm and more especially after they
leave it; by the mechanization of large-scale farming; and by the com-
petitive situations which develop when similar operations are taxed
or untaxed in accordance with the place where they are performed and
the identity of the persons performing them.
The federal act originally excluded "agricultural labor" without
further definition, and the states generally adopted this or a similar
wording. The Treasury Department by regulation,120 and most of the
states administratively, limited the exclusion to services (by whomever
performed) on a farm in the raising and care of plants and animals
and the harvesting of crops, together with the services of employees
of the farmer in processing, preparing and marketing his crops if those
services were an incident to ordinary farming operations. Forestry and
lumbering were specifically denied the exemption.
In 1939, however, Congress elaborated greatly on the statutory defi-
nition and expanded its scope, and about three-fourths of the state laws
now contain exclusions either identical with the federal act or in vary-
ing degree similar to it. Management and maintenance services on
the farm are exempted from the federal act if performed in the farm-
er's employ; while handling, processing, storage and transportation of
agricultural commodities to market are also exempted, wherever and
by whomever performed, if they are incidental to ordinary farming op-
erations, or in' the case of fruits and vegetables, incidental to the prep-
aration for market; but commercial canning and freezing operations
are specifically excluded from the definition, as is any service after the
delivery of a commodity "to a terminal market for distribution for
117. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 560.
118. Some further exposition of these concepts is found in 26 CODE FED. REGS.
§ 403.209 (1949).
119. Only the District of Columbia, where it is unimportant, covers agricul-
tural labor.
120. 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 403.208 (1949).
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consumption."' 2 1 The concept of a farm is expanded to embrace green-
houses and fur-bearing animal farms. Finally, a miscellaneous group
of activities is defined as agricultural, including the production and
harvesting of maple sirup and sugar and of gum naval stores, the
growing of mushrooms, the hatching of poultry, the ginning of cotton,
and certain irrigation operations.
A definition of "agricultural labor" can hardly avoid embracing
many activities which, considered in isolation, are of a wholly dif-
ferent kind from the typical activities of the "farm hand" as generally
conceived. Whatever the form of the definition, a mechanic, a carpen-
ter, a truck driver, an engineer, or a bookkeeper may find his labors
classed as agricultural if he works on a farm and for the farmer.12 The
present federal definition lends explicit support to the agricultural
classification of many such activities, and also extends the concepts
of a farm and of agricultural work to some operations which otherwise
might be considered not to involve farming at all.
123
Services in the primary farm operations such as cultivation of the
soil and care of growing crops are generally classed as agricultural
even though contracted out to a processor or other non-farming em-
ployer.124 But farm management and maintenance services, and under
the narrower definitions handling and processing as well, lose their
agricultural character unless they are performed by employees of the
121. This paragraph of the federal definition reads:
"(4) In handling, planting, drying, packing, packaging, processing, freez-
ing, grading, storing, or delivering to storage or to market or to a carrier for
transportation to market, any agricultural or horticultural commodity; but
only if such service is performed as an incident to ordinary farming operations
or, in the case of fruits and vegetables, as an incident to the preparation
of such fruits or vegetables for market. The provisions of this paragraph
shall not be deemed to be applicable with respect to service performed in
connection with commercial canning or commercial freezing or in connection
with any agricultural or horticultural commodity after its delivery to a
terminal market for distribution for consumption." INT. REV. CODE OF 1939,
§ 1607(1) (4)*; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3306(k)t(4).
122. Lee Wilson & Co. v. United States, 171 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1948),; United
States v. Navar, 158 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1946); Birmingham v. Rucker's Breeding
Farm, 152 F.2d'837 (8th Cir. 1945); Jones v. Gaylord Guernsey Farms, 128
F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1942); 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 403.208(c) (Supp. 1954); Irvine
Co. v. Employment Comm'n, 27 Cal.2d 570, 165 P.2d 908 (1946); American
Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Tone, 127 Conn. 132, 15 A.2d 80 (1940); Stromberg
Hatchery v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 239 Iowa 1047, 33 N.W.2d 498 (1948);
Application of Butler, 258 App. Div. 1017, 16 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1940).
123. Compare the following decisions under more limited definitions: Great
Western Mushroom Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Colo. 39, 82 P.2d 751 (1938);
Matter of Bridges, 287 N.Y. 782, 40 N.E.2d 648 (1942); Unemployment Comp.
Div. v. Valker's Greenhouses, 70 N.D. 515, 296 N.W. 143 (1941); Wilson v.
Employment Sec. Comm'n, 204 Okla. 501, 231 P.2d 664 (1951).
124. Lake Region Packing Ass'n v. United States, 146 F.2d 157 (5th Cir.
1944); Stuart v. Kleck, 129 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1942); Chester C. Fosgate Co.
v. United States, 125 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942);
Employment Comm'n v. Kovacevich, 27 Cal.2d 546, 165 P.2d 917 (1946); Cas--
sady v. Hiatt & Lee, 150 Fla. 721, 8 So.2d 661 (1942).
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farmer; and the lines which separate these various kinds of service
are by no means sharply drawn.12
The most marked change effected by the 1939 federal amendment is
in the coverage of services off the farm, particularly with respect to
drying, packing, processing plants and the like. The present federal
definition and state laws that follow it treat as agricultural many
enterprises that seem plainly commercial in character, and that some-
times resemble factories in everything except the kind of com-
modity that flows through them.u6 It has been estimated that to nar-
row the definition in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act as was done
in 1950 in old-age and survivors insurance 127 would result in extending
unemployment protection to an additional 200,000 workers whose oc-
cupations are essentially industrial in nature.
128
In dealing with services off the farm one of the most troublesome
problems, especially in the federal definition where it is explicitly
posed by the statutory language, is to mark the point when an agri-
cultural commodity has reached a "market" or a "terminal market for
distribution for consumption.' 2 9 If a farmer sells or consigns his
produce to a processor who first puts it in such condition that further
sale is commercially possible, under what circumstances is the proces-
125. See cases cited in note 124, supra; Dias v. Employment Stab. Comm'n,
113 Cal. App.2d 374, 248 P.2d 427 (1952): Vollman v. Employment Stab.
Comm'n, 104 Cal. App.2d 94, 231 P.2d 137 (1951). Under the narrower defini-
tions, similar questions arise even though the services are performed in the
employ of the owner or tenant of the farm. Smythe v. Phoenix, 63 Idaho 585,
123 P.2d 1010 (1942); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n,
supra note 90; Henry A. Dreer, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 127
N.J.L. 149, 21 A.2d 690 (1941).
126. Producers' Crop Imp. Ass'n v. Dallman, 178 F.2d 66 (7th Cir. 1949) ; In re
F. H. Hogue, Inc., 67 Idaho 398, 183 P.2d 826 (1947): Unemployment Comp.
Comm'n v. Unionville Milling Co., 313 Mich. 292, 21 N.W.2d 135 (1946); Matter
of Lazarus, 294 N.Y. 613, 64 N.E.2d 169 (1945); Cache Valley Turkey
Growers Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Utah 1, 144 P.2d 537 (1943). Even
without such a statutory definition, a similar result may occasionally be
reached. Pioneer Potato Co. v. Division of Empl. Sec., 107 A.2d 519 (N.J.
App. 1954).
127. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 1426(h); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3121(g);
SOCIAL SEcURITY ACT, § 210(f) (1935), 42 U.S.C.A. 410(f) (Supp. 1954). The
principal change was in narrowing paragraph (4) of the definition (see note
121, supra) to require that the services be performed in the employ of a farmer
or group of farmers who have produced all or most of the commodities in
question. The amendment also omitted the designation as agricultural of
services in connection with poultry hatching, raising and harvesting mush-
rooms, and producing and harvesting maple sirup and sugar.
128. See Hearings, supra note 80, at 14, 50-51. This estimate was necessarily
very rough because of the diversity of present state coverage. Id. at 114.
Witnesses for various agricultural organizations opposed the amendment of
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, largely on the ground that it would
result in discrimination between large and small producers. Hearings, at 121,
197, 215-16. No action was taken by Congress.
129. Where the statute or regulation does not use the term "market," similar
questions may arise on the issue of whether operations are incidental to
farming or are commercial in nature. Under the more limited definitions, of
course, these questions ordinarily arise only if the services are performed in
the employ of the farmer.
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sor the "market" for the farmer?m0 Is it material that the processor
may be a farmers' cooperative of which the producer is a member,
and may in some sense be acting on his behalf?13' Or that a com-
mercial processor may own a ranch or orchard, and handle some of his
own produce along with that of others?132 On all these questions courts
have differed and their differences can be explained only in part by
variations in statute or regulation.
The agricultural labor exception points up a difficulty inherent in
any occupational exclusion, that activities of even a single employee
may be in covered employment at one moment and in excepted serv-
ice the next. The difficulty is alleviated by a provision that services
of a worker during a pay period are treated as wholly covered or
wholly exempt, in accordance as his covered or his exempt work pre-
dominates in that period.133 Despite this provision, however, record-
keeping and reporting problems, as well as discriminations in the
protection afforded, can readily flow from any operation that is agri-
cultural in part and covered in part.
The exclusion of agricultural labor was originally grounded pri-
marily on administrative considerations, supported by a finding that
agricultural unemployment was not an acute problem; but with also
a suggestion that the legislature may have wished to encourage agri-
culture.13 4 With the 1939 amendment the emphasis shifted. Many
packing house and similar operations were excluded although their
coverage presented none of the record-keeping and reporting diffi-
culties associated with the coverage of farmers, 13 largely because of
130. Ewing v. McLean, 189 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1951); Miller v. Bettencourt,
161 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1947),; Miller v. Burger, 161 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1947);
Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Appeal Board, 332 Mich. 194, 50 N.W.2d
755 (1952); Matter of Lazarus, supra note 126; Janssen v. Employment Sec.
Comm'n, supra note 45.
131. Employment See. Comm'n v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 61 Ariz. 96, 144
P.2d 682 (1944); Employment Comm'n v. Butte County Rice Growers Ass'n,
25 Cal.2d 624, 154 P.2d 892 (1944); Industrial Comm'n v. United Fruit Growers
Ass'n, 106 Colo. 223, 103 P.2d 15 (1940); In re Farmers Coop. Creamery Co.,
66 Idaho 70, 155 P.2d 762 (1945); Cache Valley Turkey Growers Ass'n v.
Industrial Comm'n, supra note 126; In re Yakima Fruit Growers Ass'n, 20
Wash.2d 202, 146. P.2d 800 (1944).
132. Batt v. United States, 151 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1945); Stivers v. Depart-
ment of Empl., 42 Cal.2d 486, 267 P.2d 792 (1954); American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp. v. Tone, supra note 122; Janssen v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, supra
note 45. Cf. Florida Comm'n v. Growers Equipment Co., 152 Fla. 595, 12 So.2d
889 (1943); Claim ef Thompson, 262 App. Div. 792, 27 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1941),
aff'd, 288 N.Y. 595, 42 N.E.2d 603 (1942).
133. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 1607.(d); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3306(d).
The states have adopted similar provisions.
134. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., supra note 79, 301 U.S. at
512-3, 517, 519-20. The lower court had made a finding of fact that in Alabama
unemployment in agriculture was not an acute problem, and that "even the
old and the ill are generally worth their keep on a farm." 17 F. Supp. at 226.
135. Employment Comm'n v. Butte County Rice Growers Ass'n, supra note
131; H. Duys & Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 300, 5 A.2d 23 (1939).. Coverage of such
industrial operations, however, may in some cases add materially to the prob-
lems of seasonal employment and unemployment.
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the contention that their coverage works unfairly against those pro-
ducers who use these mechanized channels in marketing their crops.
It was again these considerations, apparently, which served to defeat
the Administration's proposal last year to narrow the scope of the
exclusion. 136 The whole agricultural labor~exclusion, indeed, probably
rests today more largely on other reasons than it does on the dif-
ficulty of collecting taxes,137 but recent experience strongly suggests
that, at least on the national level, these other reasons are deemed
adequate.
The stated reason for excluding from the original Social Security
Act the services of officers and members of the crews of vessels was
that it would be impossible to keep track of wages paid in the far
corners of the world. 38 There was also doubt that the states could
constitutionally cover maritime work under their unemployment com-
pensation laws. If the constitutional objection which the Supreme
Court had found to state workmen's compensation coverage of such
employment 39 applied equally to unemployment compensation, it ap-
parently could not be obviated by Congressional consent. 140 There is
an important difference between the two kinds of law, however, in that
workmen's compensation does, but unemployment compensation does
not, alter or supersede the common law of torts; and when the issue
reached the Supreme Court in 1943, it summarily rejected the conten-
tion that state unemployment compensation coverage interfered with
the required uniformity of the federal maritime law. 41
136. It is interesting to note that California and Florida. two of the states
most concerned, have exclusions narrower than that in the present federal
act. Employment Comm'n v. Butte County Rice Growers Ass'n, supra note
131; Square Deal Fruit Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 42 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1949).
See Hearings, supra note 80, at 42, 51. The fact that conditions vary in dif-
ferent parts of the country, however - particularly, the length of the growing
season-was urged as a reason for leaving the matter to decision by each
state.
137. Difficulties of collection would still be great with respect to certain kinds
of farm employment, especially the very short-term employment that prevails
in some farm operations. Old-age and survivors insurance still excludes agri-
cultural labor if the worker is paid cash wages of less than $100 a year by
one employer. See SocIAL SEcuaRTY AMENDMENTS of 1954, supra note 3.
138. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 33, 37 (1935).
139. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). The objection here
under consideration related, not to any matter of territorial jurisdiction, but
solely to the exclusiveness of the federal admiralty jurisdiction.
140. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
141. Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306 (1943). The doctrine of
the Jensen, Knickerbocker and Dawson cases had never been applied to strike
down state taxation. The Court had indicated, moreover, that it continued to
accept the authority of those cases only with reluctance and only in the area
immediately involved. Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942));
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
In the Standard Dredging case the Court also rejected the argument that, by
exempting the services of officers and members of crews of vessels from the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Congress had impliedly forbidden the
states to cover those services under unemployment compensation laws.
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At the end of World War II there was urgent need to close this gap
in unemployment compensation coverage because of the large number
of merchant seamen who might be expected to join the ranks of the
unemployed. Congress, accordingly, in 1946 took several steps' 42 which
(with one further extension in 1953) resulted in substantially com-
plete coverage of merchant seamen on American vessels, except for
certain fishing activities which were specifically excluded.
In the first place, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act was extended
in 1946 to the officers and crews of American vessels, provided either
that the employee was hired in the United States or that during his
employment the vessel touched at a port in this country.143 This cover-
age formula, which had been adopted for old-age and survivors in-
surance in 1939,144 largely obviated the administrative difficulties of
tax collection which had originally been anticipated in the coverage of
seamen. Fishing, except commercial salmon or halibut fishing, was
excluded unless on a vessel of more than ten net tons.
In the second place, the state where the office is situated from which
the operations of an American vessel are directed was permitted by
Congress to cover services on that vessel under its unemployment
compensation law, and all other states were forbidden to do so. 145 As in
the case of federal instrumentalities, the permission was coupled with
a prohibition of discrimination. Finally, to meet the immediate needs
of seamen who had been employed, by the federal government through
the War Shipping Administration, Congress set up a three-year pro-
gram under which the states made payments of unemployment com-
pensation to such seamen as agents of the United States. In 1953, the
coverage of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, and the Congres-
sional permission of coverage by the state where the operating office is
situated, were extended to merchant vessels of the United States oper-
ated by general agents of the Secretary of Commerce. 146
Most state laws, either by amendment or because they provided for
automatic extension when federal coverage was extended, or in some
cases because they had never expressly excluded employment on
vessels, soon effected the maritime coverage which was thus permitted
by Congress. In the few remaining coastal states, reciprocal inter-
state arrangements and voluntary coverage have brought about sub-
stantially the same practical result.
142. SOCIAL SEcURITY ACT AMENDMENTS of 1946. 60 STAT. 978.
143. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 1607(c) and (n); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§83306(c) and (m).
144. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, 8§ 1426(b) and (g); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 3121(b) and (f) ; SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, §§ 210 (a) and (c) (1935), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 410(a) and (c) (Supp. 1954).
145. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 1606(f); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3305(f).
146. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 1606(g)-(i), 1607(o); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 3305 (g) - (i), 3306 (n).
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Service on foreign vessels, together with occasional state exclusion
of those fishing activities exempted from the federal tax, is virtually
all that remains of the originally widespread exclusion of maritime em-
ployment. With the objection based on admiralty jurisdiction disposed
of by the Supreme Court, and with the subsequent federal legislation,
any lingering doubt of a state's constitutional authority to tax an
employer for services rendered outside the territorial limits of the
state or even on the high seas' 47 is probably academic, since extension
of the federal tax to maritime service has rendered attack on state
levies ordinarily unprofitable.
"The Social Security Act is an attempt to find a method by which
all these [federal and state] public agencies may work together to a
common end."' 48 In the matter of coverage there is no doubt that
they have worked together, but it is less easy to pronounce a judgment
on the result of their cooperation.
IV
State legislatures, as we have seen, have frequently copied verbatim
the language of the federal act and its amendments, and in such cases
state courts have naturally tended to assume an identity of legislative
purpose, and to look to federal precedents and federal legislative
history in aid of the interpretation of their state laws.149 Even where
coverage definitions are identical, however, there can be no guaranty
of consistent decisions by federal and state administrators or courts.150
Provisions in state laws Which hinge the state coverage on the federal,
or which automatically expand or contract the state law with future
changes in the federal act, may lead to cumbersome processes of
adjudication, and pose constitutional issues which would be more
147. Attack on this ground, with respect to a period antedating the federal
legislation, was rejected in Matter of Standard Towing Corp., 276 App. Div.
637, 97 N.Y.S.2d 244, appeal denied, 301 N.Y. 816, 95 N.E.2d. 59 (1950). Federal
law now provides a basis for allocating maritime service among the states
different from the basis used for other multistate employment, but the dif-
ference would not seem to be of constitutional significance, except possibly as
the federal prohibition of double taxation of maritime employment may obviate
another ground which has occasionally been urged as a constitutional objection.
Cf. Claim of Mallia, 299 N.Y. 232, 86 N.E.2d 577 (1949).
148. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra note 79 at 588.
149. H. Duys & Co. v. Tone, supra note 135; Cache Valley Turkey Growers
Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 126; state cases cited in note 115,
supra. Where a state has not adopted a federal exclusion, the argument some-
times advanced, that because of the interrelationship of the statutes a cor-
responding exclusion from state law should be implied, has been given the
short shrift it obviously deserves. Wilson v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, supra
note 123; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, supra note
90; Wiley v. Harris, supra note 45. That a federal exemption ordinarily implies
no federal mandate for a corresponding state exclusion, see Standard Dredging
Corp. v. Murphy, supra note 141.
150. Matcovich v. Anglim, 134 F.2d 834 (9th cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 744
(1943); Batt v. United States, supra note 132.
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troublesome if there were not so rarely an incentive to raise them.
151
But these provisions serve a useful purpose in enabling the states to
adjust more readily to changes in the federal law, a point of especial
interest at this time because of the impending federal coverage of
employers of four or more.
Despite occasional difficulties, the federal-state scheme has worked
reasonably smoothly in regard to coverage and, at the cost of some
duplication of effort inherent in the dual system, has assured unem-
ployment protection in all states substantially as broad as the coverage
of the federal act.
In addition to the inducement of the tax-credit mechanism and the
federal grants for administration, Congress has taken several steps
to remove obstacles which might otherwise have hindered the opera-
tion or the expansion of state unemployment compensation laws.
At the outset it eliminated the commerce clause as a ground of ob-
jection to the coverage of activities in interstate or foreign com-
merce, 152 and as we have seen, it has since taken similar action with
respect to privately owned federal instrumentalities, activities on
federal enclaves, and services (including some in the employ of the
federal government) on the navigable waters of the United States or
on the high seas.15 3 The states, on their part, have cooperated with the
federal government, not only in expanding their own laws when
federal tax coverage has been enlarged, but in acting on behalf of
the United States in administering benefits based on federal military
or civilian service.
When we look to the evolutionary processes characteristic of new
and experimental social programs, the record in unemployment com-
pensation is less easy to appraise. As compared with the wholly state
systems of workmen's compensation, of course, the federal-state system
of unemployment compensation was vastly more effective in at-
taining quickly nation-wide coverage of a large portion of employment
in industry and commerce. As compared with the wholly national
system of old-age and survivors insurance, on the other hand, growth
of the federal-state system since its first formative years has been dis-
appointingly slow. Bits of coverage have been added from time to
time, but other bits have been subtracted. The problems differ in
151. See notes 90 and 91, supra. The complex interrelationships that may
arise are illustrated by Louis A. Demute, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n,
supra note 43, in which the state court found itself required to pass upon
the propriety, under federal law, of a refund of taxes made by the Federal
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
152. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1939, § 1606(a); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
3305(a); Perkins v. Pennsylvania, 314 U.S. 586 (1942),; Standard Dredging
Corp. v. Murphy, supra note 141.
153. See pp. 271 and 281 and note 98, supra.
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important respects, but it is an arguable thesis that the division of
responsibility between federal and state legislatures has accounted in
some part for the failure of unemployment compensation to expand
within its appropriate sphere as rapidly as old-age and survivors in-
surance has expanded in its.
The reasons most commonly advanced in favor of state rather than
national operation of unemployment compensation are the variation
in local conditions and the desirability of local experimentation. In
the matter of coverage, the validity of the former argument is question-
able except in some areas of agricultural labor; while the validity of
the latter would be more apparent if there were evidence that a suc-
cessful experiment in one state had led either to further action in that
state or to comparable action in others. Yet these arguments, but-
tressing the ever-present zeal for "states' rights" in general, have un-
doubtedly made Congress more reluctant to force action on the states
than it might have been to take direct action if it had had the whole
responsibility to itself. 5 4 On the other side, one can only guess how
far the limitations of federal coverage may have influenced state
legislatures against further expansion of their own laws. Except in
regard to small firms, there are only two areas in which any sub-
stantial number of states has extended coverage significantly beyond
the federal act: in the borderland of agricultural labor, where the
states first acted under the impetus of the original Social Security
Act, and have not in all cases followed the retraction of federal cov-
erage; and in the borderland of the employment relation, where the
scope of the federal coverage was in doubt until the Supreme Court
defined it in broad terms and Congress redefined it narrowly. 155
Other factors than these, however, likewise stand in the way of
154. For similar reasons, it appears in retrospect that the constitutionality
of a nationally operated system of unemployment compensation would have
been considerably easier to sustain that it was, as against the charge of coercion
of the states, to sustain the constitutionality of the system actually adopted.
The broad sweep of the opinion upholding the national old-age insurance sys-
tem [Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937)'] stands in marked contrast to the
cautious discussion of the tax-credit mechanism in unemployment compensa-
tion and the careful limitation of that decision to the precise case before the
Court. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra note 79, at 585-93.
155. Coverage of state and local public employment, related as it is to other
aspects of such employment, is a matter in which state and local policies seem
clearly to predominate over the national interest. Such coverage has been
left to state or local decision in old-age and survivors insurance as well as in
unemployment compensation, and probably would be so left even if there
were no constitutional obstacle to compulsory coverage. In the case of charit-
able and other non-profit organizations, old-age and survivors insurance cover-
age has also been made voluntary, largely in response to a fear that com-
pulsory coverage might jeopardize the exemption of such organizations from
other taxes. Compulsory unemployment compensation coverage would pre-
sumably meet the same objection, and with the same result. While voluntary
coverage is open to such organizations in most states, they probably have less
incentive to avail themselves of it than they have in the case of old-age and
survivors insurance.
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expansion of coverage comparable to what has occurred in old-age
and survivors insurance. Unemployment compensation is not suitable
for the genuinely self-employed because they are not generally sub-
ject to the risk insured against. The concept of unemployment-more,
probably, than the concept of retirement, and obviously more than
death-may be difficult of application to those marginal employ-
ments that are so prevalent in agricultural and domestic service, and
that are sometimes found in the twilight zone between employment
and self-employment. In expanding coverage thought must be given
to benefit administration as well as to tax collection.
But considerations such as these, though they may argue for pro-
ceeding with caution, do not argue for standing still. If our federal-
state system is to fulfill the claims made on its behalf, Congress should
eliminate the exclusion of small firms and should bring the federal
definitions of the employment relationship and of agricultural labor
into line with the laws of the more progressive states; and local ex-
perimentation should cease to be a mere exercise in local diversity
and become in fact, what the words imply, a continuing process
of testing ways and means of expanding coverage into areas not yet
reached by the federal act.
